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MISSING EVIDENCE 
Dale A. Nance* 
In a system of litigation that depends on the parties to marshal 
witnesses, documents, and other things as evidence, there is a strong 
incentive for each party to collect information and to filter the infor-
mation thus assembled so as to present to the tribunal only evidence 
that supports that party's cause. I take this to be an uncontroversial 
claim. More controversial, of course, is the proposition that the self-
interest of the adversaries, coupled with existing tools of investigation 
and formal discovery, will offset the filtering effect and result in an 
optimal, or at least satisfactory, presentation of evidence at trial. De-
spite the adversarial clash, there is ample reason to believe that satis-
factory results often cannot be reached without the aid of 
supplemental prophylactic and remedial rules, and indeed may not be 
reached even with such rules in place. There is, in other words, a 
problem of missing evidence. In this essay, I shall explore the dimen-
sions of this problem and the responses the law has generated. 
It is not my contention that relatively inquisitorial systems are 
free of such problems. 1 While I shall try to identify ways in which the 
effective response to missing evidence is constrained by the employ-
ment of adversarial methods, I do not wish to address here the issue 
of which general kind of procedure would best handle the problem of 
missing evidence. Rather, I intend to operate within the framework 
of the largely adversarial systems employed in the United States, civil 
and criminal, for I wish to address the issue of how we should think 
about responses to that problem within our processes of discovery and 
trial. Indeed, I do not wish to overstate the seriousness of the prob-
lem of missing evidence in an adversarial system. In particular, I 
* Associate Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law; B.A., 1974, Rice University; J.D., 1977, Stanford University; M.A. (Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy), 1982, University of California, Berkeley. Financial support for work on this 
paper was provided through the Marshall D. Ewell Research Fund. Research assistance was 
ably provided by Donald Coleman, class of 1992. Helpful comments on a draft were given by 
Jim Lindgren and Lloyd Cohen. 
I I use the term "adversarial" to refer to systems of dispute resolution that give the parties 
primary responsibility for marshalling and presenting evidence to a relatively passive tribunal, 
as contrasted with "inquisitorial" systems that rely upon a judicial officer to collect and assimi-
late information for the tribunal's consideration. See generally, Damaska, Presentation of Evi-
dence and Factjinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083 (1975). The adversarial/ 
inquisitorial debate continues. For samples of the best of the debate, compare Langbein, The 
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) with Gross, The Ameri-
can Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MicH. L. REV. 734 (1987). 
831 
832 CARDOZO LAW REVIEfV [Vol. 13:831 
ought not be read as suggesting that the law has not directed serious 
attention to it, nor that the law's responses are wholly ineffectual. 
The panoply of responses is extensive, and there may be reason to 
suspect correctible redundancy. This essay is not so much a call for 
draconian action as an invitation to analytical reflection. 2 On the 
other hand, I will not operate at the micro-level of case parsing 
through the details of the many doctrines that have been developed by 
courts and legislatures to deal with the problem of missing evidence. 
Instead, I want to explore the general contours of these juridical 
responses. 
Given the nature of my enterprise, I resist stating a specific the-
sis. Nevertheless, for the reader who wants an organizing or motivat-
ing principle, I offer the following two recurrent themes. First, I want 
to examine the relationship of traditional admissibility rules to the 
problem of missing evidence and to other forms of juridical response 
to that problem. The reason for this interest will be explained in the 
next section. Second, I want to investigate, as we proceed, the extent 
to which the regulation of proof, evidence law broadly conceived, is 
instrumentally related to accuracy or truth seeking, and the extent to 
which it is a function of other concerns not demonstrably parasitic 
upon the accuracy criterion. The problem of missing evidence 
presents a useful vehicle for examining this question. My leaning, as 
will be evident, is toward the former, instrumentalist conception, 
without wanting to deny entirely the role of the latter. I will not offer 
here a sustained argument to that effect, for that is not my present 
purpose. I intend to provide such an argument in future work. 
THE PROBLEMS OF MISSING EVIDENCE 
The term "missing evidence" may seem self-contradictory, at 
least to anyone who thinks of "evidence" as "testimony, writings, ma-
terial objects, or other things presented to the senses that a:re offered 
to prove the existence or nonexistence of a faci." 3 If it is "offered," 
evidence can hardly be missing. Still, my usage should not be confus-
ing, as I mean the term "evidence" to refer to information that could 
be "presented to the senses" and, indeed, would be presented to the 
tribunal in a procedurally optimal world of costless information. h 
2 A call to action is made in Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: 
The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991). My comment on 
Nesson's article appears as Nance, Hear No Evil, See No Evil: A Comment on Professor Nes-
son's Claims About Evidence Suppression, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 809 (1991). 
3 CAL. Evro. CODE§ 140 (West 1974). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 656 (rev. 
4th ed. 1968) (evidence defined as "[a]ny species of proof, or probative matter, legally 
presented at the trial of an issue .... ") (citations omitted). 
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therefore includes information that should be presented as evidence in 
the world as it is but that may not be, at least without some judicial 
intervention. This last caveat is not meant, of course, to limit my 
scope to situations in which the missing evidence can and will be 
forthcoming in response to appropriate judicial intervention. Some 
evidence may be irretrievably lost, and that may be of considerable 
importance to the framing of juridical responses. 4 
This broad notion of evidence readily indicates that the problem 
of missing evidence is not limited to the intentional filtering of damag-
ing evidence by a litigant. We must take a wider focus than that sug-
gested by the preceding introductory comments. This can be done by 
distinguishing among various ways in which potentially relevant in-
formation can come to be missing at trial. As a very general proposi-
tion, relevant information will be presented at trial if it is perceived as 
favorable on balance to a party who is aware of and has reasonable 
access to the evidence in question. By negating the predicate of this 
proposition, one can readily identify the principal modes by which 
evidence may come to be missing. 
On the one hand, it may be that information that might be very 
helpful to a trier of fact never comes to the attention of either party to 
the dispute. If neither party knows the information, neither will have 
reason to present it to the tribunal. Although there may be, in any 
given situation, no way for the evidence to come to the parties' atten-
tion, generally one cannot know that in advance. The question of ju-
dicial intervention must accordingly focus on the parties' decisions 
about the commitment of resources to investigation and development 
of evidence. In fact, there is not very much that the law has seen fit to 
do in terms of direct regulation of resource allocation. Rather, the 
law has placed primary reliance upon the motivation and capacity of 
the parties to develop information that may be of use. The possibility 
of litigation being significantly affected by "unfound" evidence is 
thereby presented. 5 
In contrast, evidence can be missing from the trial of a dispute 
even though it comes to the attention of, and becomes readily avail-
able for presentation by, one or both parties. This can happen in a 
4 For some purposes, one must distinguish between information and the thing that em-
bodies or provides that information, like a document or witness. The term "evidence" is used 
here to refer either to the information or the thing, as context requires. 
s A party may have knowledge of the existence of evidence of potential importance to the 
case, but not know the exact contents thereof. In such cases, further investigation is necessary 
to discern the evidential content of the thing, whether it be a document the precise content of 
which is unknown or a witness whose precise testimony is unknown. The category of "un-
found evidence" is intended to include such cases. 
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number of ways: (a) though the evidence is readily available to both 
parties, each simply overlooks the information, finds it insufficiently 
favorable to be presented to the tribunal, or finds its favorable proba-
tive value in the case outweighed by considerations extlinsic to the 
particular litigation; (b) though evidence is or would be perceived as 
sufficiently favorable to one side to warrant its introduction at trial, it 
is reasonably available only to the other, and the latter chooses not to 
present the information to the tribunal; or (c) though evidence avail-
able to a party is perceived as sufficiently favorable to warrant its 
presentation to the tribunal, its introduction at trial is blocked by the 
opponent's invocation of an exclusionary rule. 6 Once again, the law 
has had relatively little to say about situation (a), which I shall call, 
for lack of a better term, the case of "rejected" evidence. 7 Situation 
(b), however, has occasioned a wider variety of juridical responses. 
Though linguistic conventions are weak in this area, I shall call this 
the problem of "suppression" of evidence, and it will be recognized as 
involving the filteling problem identified in the introduction. 8 Finally, 
situation (c) involves the sanction of the principle or policy behind the 
exclusionary rule that is invoked. 
Should the law care about missing evidence? H so, ought the 
extent of the concern depend upon the mode by which the evidence 
comes to be missing? We can start with the working proposition that 
the law has an interest, which can of course be overridden by other 
concerns, in the presentation of all reasonably available information 
relevant to the disputed issues of fact in a case. Fact-finding, as a 
component task of dispute resolution, compels the law to take such an 
interest. 9 This claim is itself potentially controversial, for one might 
6 While it is possible for evidence directed toward a controverted factual issue to be per-
ceived by both sides as favorable, in such a case the evidence will be presented as long as either 
party has access to it, and the nonpresenting party will naturally forgo any applicable objec-
tion. Thus, such evidence will come to be missing at trial only when it is unfound. 
7 It should be understood that the rejection is by the parties, rather than by the court as in 
case (c), and that the rejection may be inadvertent. 
8 In particular, "suppressed evidence" includes both evidence that is withheld from the 
tribunal and evidence that is destroyed. Compare Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Implied 
from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 226-27, 234 (1935) ("suppression" used 
broadly to include both destruction and withholding) with Solum & Marzen, Truth and Uncer-
tainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1118 (1987) ("sup-
pression" distinguished from destruction). Moreover, my definition does not assume that an 
act of suppression is necessarily committed with an intent to hide the information or with any 
other particular mental state. 
9 Legal fact-finding, like most other forms of factual inquiry, involves inductive inference. 
The validity of such inferences is constrained by the principle of complete evidence, namely 
that the premises of the inference contain all logically relevant evidence available. See, e.g., A. 
JBURKS, CHANCE, CAUSE, REASON 20 (1977); B. SKYRMS, CHOICE AND CHANCE 25 (2d ed. 
1975); W. SALMON, LOGIC 91 (2d ed. 1973). Of course, legal adjudication is not only a fact-
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say, at least in civil cases, that the law sets about, or should set about, 
not to draw inferences as to the truth about litigated events, but only 
to compare the strength of inferences argued by the plaintiff with 
those argued by the defendant, regardless of what the best inference 
would be under the condition of knowledge of all reasonably available 
information. 10 However, even in evaluating the relative strength of 
competing inferences, the tribunal has an interest in any information 
that will shed light upon them, though the parties have not presented 
the information. 11 Only when information is not reasonably available 
may the law rightly forgo efforts to gain access to its potential, and 
even then the law may have to take the absence into account in con-
sidering burdens of proof. 12 
Beyond these general claims, however, much depends upon con-
text and countervailing concerns. One of the most important features 
of context is the employment of an adversarial system of litigation and 
the implications that has for the ways in which the law's interest in 
relevant information is manifested. The problems of unfound, re-
jected, and suppressed evidence in the adversarial context will be ad-
dressed seriatim in subsequent parts of this essay. Before doing so, 
however, it will be useful to consider briefly the last category identi-
fied above, for the exclusion of evidence as a matter of legal policy 
bears an interesting relationship to the general topic of missing evi-
dence. As it happens, it was my study of admissibility that led me to 
a serious interest in the more general issue. 
Excluded Evidence 
The law, of course, has had much to say about admissibility. The 
exclusion of irrelevant evidence would seem to pose very little cost of 
the sort that is of concern to us here. At worst, there is the risk that 
the courts, especially trial courts, will err by excluding evidence that 
finding activity, but it is at least that. See generally JACKSON, Questions of Fact and Questions 
of Law, in FACTS IN LAW 85 (W. Twining ed. 1983). 
IO Ron Allen's work on the logic of civil trials might seem to suggest this kind of response 
by stressing the probabilistic comparison of the parties' "well specified" versions of the events 
and the absence of a state interest in the exploration of the "particularities" of the case beyond 
what is presented by the parties, though he qualifies this with a commitment to full discovery 
and even the use of adverse inferences from failure to present available evidence. See Allen, A 
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U.L. REV. 401, 425-31 (1986); see also Allen, The 
Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991). 
II Note that a strongly inquisitorial system, in which nonpartisan officials managed all 
evidence collection, could still be run on the basis of the comparative strength of case model. 
12 See Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TUL. L. REV. 
457 (1991) (a comparative approach that ignores the completeness of evidence neglects impor-
tant substantive and procedural values, and incompleteness is not always dependent upon 
availability). 
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is in fact relevant, and even this relatively minor danger is reduced if 
the interpretation of the relevance requirement is only that the trial 
judge should exclude evidence that no reasonable trier of fact could 
find probative, rather than requiring exclusion of evidence that the 
judge thinks is not probative. 13 However, when exclusion is based 
upon some rule that presupposes that the evidence in question is or 
may be relevant, there is a real danger that exclusion itself will con-
tribute to the problem of missing evidence. 14 This danger is the 
sotB.rce of the recurrent anxiety felt about exclusionary rules generally, 
and the resulting attitude is one of attempting to balance the loss of 
probative information against the good, however defined, that is 
thought to result from the exclusion. 
Nm.v the purposes of these suprarelevance exclusionary rules are 
many, and the goods thought to result from exclusion varied. Indeed, 
the heterogeneity of these purposes and goods is often considered a 
peculiarity of evidence 1aw. 15 Ironically, though, and despite their im-
mediate impact,. the principal purpose of many exclusionary rules is to 
increase the flow of relevant information to the tribunal. In two previ-
ous articles, I have argued that these rules operate to educate and 
discipline the parties in their presentation of evidence by inducing 
them to expand the package of relevant inf01mation received by the 
tlibunal. 16 Such preferential exclusionary rules are concerned not 
with balancing the probative value of the challenged evidence against 
its intrinsic probative dangers, which is the most common way of con-
ceptualizing the matter, but rather with balancing the probative value 
of the challenged evidence against the distortion arising from the loss 
of other evidence the presentation of which is supposed to be en-
couraged by the contemplated exclusion. 
For example, the prima facie exclusion of secondary evidence of 
the contents of a document 17 is justified, if at all, not by the superior-
ity of a total evidence package having no evidence of the contents over 
13 FED. R. Evm. 401 (defining relevance) and FED. R. Evm. 402 (excluding irrelevant 
evidence) are silent on the matter, but sparse primary authority favors the former interpreta-
tion. See United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976). Given the liberally 
inclusive definition of relevance commonly employed, the two standards are easily conflated. 
See lA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 37.2, at 1023 n.6 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
14 One of the untoward consequences of exclusion is that it may be necessary to take steps 
to prevent a jury from inferring that the absence of the excluded evidence is due to the propo-
nent's failure to present it. See Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative 
Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L REV. 1011 (1978). 
1S The insight is traceable at least to Thayer. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 263-70 (1898). 
16 See Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L REv. 227 (1988); Nance, Condi-
tional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U.L. REV. 447 (1990). 
17 See, e.g., FED. R Evm. 1002 (requiring original to prove contents). 
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a total evidence package having only secondary evidence of the con-
tents, but rather by the superiority of a total evidence package having 
the original document over a total evidence package having only sec-
ondary evidence of its contents. Of course, there is the possibility 
that, under particular circumstances, the proponent cannot reason-
ably be expected to present the original, which gives rise to a variety 
of excuses allowed as against the prima facie exclusion. 18 One claim 
that I make and defend in the earlier articles is that this excusable 
preference structure is common to many rules besides the so-called 
best evidence rule. Indeed, it characterizes most of the exclusionary 
rules not based upon notions of privilege. 19 
The significance of this argument to the problem of missing evi-
dence is readily seen. These exclusionary rules serve to counteract 
forces leading to the absence of relevant evidence under the other 
three categories. That is, a party may seek out evidence that is needed 
to satisfy a preferential exclusionary rule and that otherwise would go 
unfound. Similarly, a party proponent may present evidence that is 
needed to satisfy a preferential exclusionary rule and that otherwise 
would be rejected by both parties or suppressed by the proponent. 
The operation of these rules thus serves as a substantial limitation 
upon the free play of adversarial forces at trial, in the interest of im-
proving the accuracy of judgments by means of a more complete pres-
entation of the relevant evidence. 20 
Most modem theory concerning the rationale of the rules of evi-
dence goes to considerable lengths to avoid this kind of conclusion. 
Since the late nineteenth century, the mainstream view has accepted 
IB See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 1004 (specifying excuses for nonproduction). 
19 Other such rules include: the rule requiring witnesses to take an oath; the rule requiring 
witnesses to submit to cross-examination; the hearsay rule; the lay opinion rule; and the rule 
for sequestering of witnesses, see Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 281-86; the attested 
document rule, id. at 254; the doctrine of conditional relevance, see Nance, Conditional Rele-
vance, supra note 16, at 456-83; the authentication and identification rules, id. at 484-88 & 490-
97; and, to a considerable extent, the personal knowledge rule, id. at 488-92. Some rules, not 
operating as exclusionary rules, do not have quite the same excusable preference structure but 
are nonetheless a product of the need to increase the flow of useful information to the tribunal 
beyond what would arise from the free play of adversarial forces. An example is the inclusion-
ary doctrine known· as the rule of verbal completeness, see Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 
16, at 284-85. 
zo One might object that excluding proffered evidence E2 in favor of preferred evidence E1 
could not create greater completeness of the evidence unless the proponent were allowed to 
introduce E2 provided E1 is also introduced. In point of fact, that is the structure of most 
preferential exclusionary rules, with the partial and somewhat complex exception of the hear-
say rule. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 270-78 (E2 is excluded upon the intro-
duction of E 1 primarily when and because the former is necessarily redundant or erroneously 
at variance with the latter) and at 281-84 (providing further illustrations, including the oath 
requirement, the cross-examination requirement, and the hearsay rule). 
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the accuracy goal, but has focused on lay jurors and their alleged 
emotionalism and ignorance. 21 Some recent work has played down 
the accuracy criterion and looked for other expianations of eviden-
tiary rules. 22 Hybrids of these positions have also developed, deem-
phasizing accuracy in general but retaining the focus on control of the 
decision-maker in order to explain admissibility rulesY To be sure, 
the differences among the foregoing views are sometimes, perhaps 
often, matters of emphasis, and each contains an element of truth, but 
the differences are important nonetheless. What follows may shed 
some further light on the controversy. 
UNFOUND EVIDENCE 
lin principle, the parties' collective commitment to case investiga-
tion can diverge from the optimal. On the one hand, the accurate 
resolution of the case has value to third parties, most notably the 
members of the tribunal itself, that may not be reflected in the parties' 
investigative trade-o:ffs. 24 This could lead to underinvestigated cases. 
21 See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 15, at 266 (in excluding information "as being dangerous in 
[its] effect on the jury, and likely to be misused or overestimated by that body," the law of 
evidence is stamped "as the child of the jury system."). See also Weinstein, Some Difficulties in 
Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L REV. 223 (1966) (argu-
ing that conventional view is breaking down). 
22 See, e.g., Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (claiming many rules of evidence are attributable to a 
policy, explicit or implicit, of generating verdicts acceptable to the public, whether accurate or 
not) and Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1978) (positing 
justice as the goal of dispute resolution but denigrating truth-finding partly because justice is 
erroneously conceived in terms of the perceptions of litigants). 
2 3 For example, Stephan Landsman, in his defense of the adversary system, recognizes 
litigant autonomy as a goal but acknowledges the existence of admissibility rules designed to 
protect the "neutrality and passivity" of the decision-maker by shielding it from "misleading" 
or prejudicial evidence; when it comes to controlling the litigants in their adversarial zeal, 
Landsman writes only of rules of "ethics" that constrain the behavior of counsel. See S. 
LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 5 (1984). The focus 
of admissibility rules is thereby directed away from control of the litigants and toward control 
of the decision-maker. However, admitting hearsay or secondary evidence of the contents of a 
document or unauthenticated tangible evidence poses no threat to the neutrality or passivity of 
the trier of fact, unless one adopts an oddly expansive notion of neutrality such that one is not 
neutral if one is misled by the evidence, making most errors the result of bias. Landsman also 
argues that having a strict evidentiary code serves to constrain judges and increase the auton-
omy of the parties in their conduct of the litigation. !d. This is true as a virtue of rule-based 
exclusionary sanctions over discretionary exclusionary sanctions, but not as a virtue of exclu-
sionary sanctions over the absence of exclusionary sanctions. 
2 4 The public has such an interest in view of both its substantive policies and its provision 
of the tribunal to settle the dispute, and the decision-maker, whether judge or jury, has such an 
interest in view of the responsibility of sitting in judgment on fellow citizens. See Nance, Best 
Evidence, supra note 16, at 230-31. Mixing the jargon of economists and philosophers, positive 
externalities associated with increased accuracy are likely to be due to preferences entitled to 
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More likely, the desire of the parties' attorneys to thoroughly-and 
profitably-prepare the case, and the parties' inability to effectively 
monitor their attorneys' conduct of the litigation, may lead to exces-
sive investigation. It is difficult to solve the former problem within 
the framework of an adversarial system employing passive judicial of-
ficers. The converse problem of overinvestigation would seem to be 
somewhat more tractable .within the prevailing structure. One can, 
for example, imagine judicial supervision of parties' investigation 
costs to keep them from getting out of line with the importance of the 
controversy. However, given the parties' interest in keeping costs 
within the range of the value of the controversy to them and the long-
run interest of attorneys in maintaining satisfied clients, the marginal 
benefits of such expenditure control would probably not be worth the 
interference with litigant and lawyer autonomy, or at least so the law 
assumes. Moreover, it is not implausible that the mechanisms leading 
to underinvestigation and those leading to overinvestigation offset one 
another to a considerable extent, except perhaps in those unusual 
cases in which the broad social or political importance of the case is 
substantially greater, by any conceivable measure, than its personal 
significance to the litigants. 25 
One factor might suggest otherwise. A litigant cannot investi-
gate without the resources to do so, and one may suppose that some 
cases are underinvestigated because one or both parties simply do not 
have the means to support an optimal acquisition of information. 
Putting aside altruistic sources of support, both public and private, 
this argument presupposes either that the_ gains from successful litiga-
tion do not have transferrable economic value, or that there is an im-
perfection in the "market for litigation" such that others will not 
underwrite the litigation of a party lacking adequate resources. 
We are all familiar with the principal mechanisms for such sup-
port in civil litigation: the contingent fee contract between plaintiffs 
and their lawyers and the duty to defend incident to a contract of 
liability insurance.26 The former allows law firms to front the neces-
sary expenses of litigation for the relatively poor plaintiff in the expec-
respect. Cf R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 233-38 (rev. ed. 1978) (distinguishing 
personal from external preferences). 
25 One thinks of cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding 
racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional). As the Brown litigation demonstrates, 
nonparty resources are sometimes quite effectively brought to bear. See generally R. KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977). 
26 Moreover, a significant part of civil litigation ends up being a battle between insurance 
companies, with first-party insurers subrogated to the claims of the injured person. 
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tation of compensation out of the eventual recovery. 27 On the defense 
side, given that the very poor are usually judgment proof, and given 
the prevalence of liability insurance with respect to the not so poor, 
the problem of the impecunious litigant is even less severe.28 There 
may be a significant number of cases where these support mechanisms 
do not function adequately, but it can be doubted whether they are a 
frequent enough occurrence to warrant . the kind of institutional 
changes that would be necessary to deal with them at the systemic 
level. Private and public altruism, in the forms of pro bono work and 
taxpayer-supported legal assistance to the poor, help remove doubts 
on this score.29 To be sure, there are numerous claims, ex delicto or 
ex contractu, that cannot practically be pursued because the costs of 
litigation exceed the value in controversy, but this is not a problem 
related specifically to investigation costs. Though there are good rea-
sons to make efforts to reduce litigation costs and thereby make such 
claims practically viable, the law should not generally act so as to 
require investigative expenditures, whether from private or public 
sources, that are out of line with the severity of the substantive 
claim. 30 If there is a major problem of underinvestigation on the civil 
side, it is probably due to ignorance of the existing litigation suppmi 
27 SeeR. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 21.9 (3d ed. 1986) (contingent fees and 
class actions). By citing Judge Posner, I do not mean to suggest any broad, nonnative effi-
ciency c!iterion. The discussion here draws only on the descriptive ("positive") elements of 
the economic analysis of law. 
2 8 Of course, both plaintiffs' lawyers and insurance companies charge a price for their 
assistance, which raises the difficult question of whether justice should have a price, or to put 
the matter more accurately, who should bear the inevitable reality that justice is not a free 
good. But whether or not the surcharging of deserving plaintiffs (or deserving defendants, for 
that matter) for the costs of effectuating justice seems ultimately fair, it will have less effect 
upon the optimality of information provided to the tribunal than upon the decision to litigate 
in the first place or the decision to settle. See id. at 537-4D (addressing possible change in 
general American rule to adopt a prevailing party entitlement to recover attorney's fees from 
opponent). 
2 9 Because of such efforts, there is a recognition, even among those sharply critical of the 
status quo, that the problem now is more the provision of legal services to the middle class. 
See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 119-29 (1980) (suggesting public provision of legal 
services to all, on the model of public education, public parks, postal services, and the like). It 
is disconcerting, to say the least, that Judge Frankel shows no real appreciation for what seri-
ous study of such public services reveals. For example, the postal service has long been the 
deserving target of critical commentary. Among recent work, see generally, J. BovARD, 
SLOWER IS BETTER (1991). Similarly, consumer sovereignty and privatization are rapidly 
being recognized as the key ideas of reform for our troubled public schools. See, e.g., J. 
CHUBB & T. MoE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990). 
30 To the extent that acceptance of such a view creates incentives to intentional wrongdo-
ing, even when not subject to criminal prosecution, the availability of punitive awards will 
often create the expectancy necessary to induce litigation and investigation. See Mallor & 
Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649-50 
(1980). 
1991] MISSING EVIDENCE 841 
mechanisms, primarily among potential plaintiffs, leading to the fail-
ure to file practically viable claims in the first place. 31 In any event, 
our concern here is with the adjudicated case that is under investi-
gated rather than the meritorious claim that is, for whatever reason, 
not adjudicated. 
This problem may be worse in criminal cases. Many, perhaps 
most, defendants cannot afford an effective defense, and there is usu-
ally no direct financial return from success at trial out of which a 
lawyer might take a contingent fee. However, some defense lawyers 
have long served a similar function, lending against the future earn-
ings, legal or illegal, of the defendant, though such loans may be very 
risky investments even if the defendant is exonerated. Moreover, 
nowadays there are the resources of the public defenders' office as well 
as other taxpayer-supported provision of legal assistance to the ac-
cused. Oddly, then, the problem of underinvestigation may well be 
more serious on the prosecution side, which generally shares the tight 
resource constraints of the public defenders but also bears the princi-
pal burdens of proof. In many cases, the prosecution's evidence is the 
evidence. Cases, especially run-of-the-mill cases, not infrequently 
arise in which the government has put inadequate efforts into the 
preparation of the case, given the seriousness of the consequences, 
preferring perhaps to rely on the jury's presuming guilt. 32 Moreover, 
government bureaucracies being what they are, it is not at all clear 
that increasing the budgets of police and prosecutors will reduce the 
incidence or severity of this kind of problem. The last point applies 
for public defenders, as well. 
The Problem of Resource Imbalance 
The foregoing observations do not specifically address the dis-
tinct, but related, problem of imbalance in the litigation resources 
available to parties. It is often supposed that such imbalance leads to 
a skewing of the evidence in favor of the wealthier party. 33 In view of 
the inherent constraints on the wealthier party, arising from the value 
of the case itself, generally this problem can be serious only where the 
poorer party has inadequate resources relative to the significance of 
31 This factor is surely being reduced by an increasing legal consciousness of the populace, 
resulting in turn from a variety of factors, including the growth of mass media generally and 
the advent of legal advertising in particular. 
32 Examples are noted in the following discussion of the law's response to underinvestiga-
tion. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
33 See Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL & PuB. AFF. 303, 303-04 
(1988). This, of course, is not the only evil thought to be caused by such imbalance, see id. at 
304, but what is said here may have some bearing on the other issues. 
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the case, and this can happen, as noted above, only if the gains from 
successful litigation do not have economic value or there are defects in 
the market for litigation. However, there are situations where, re-
gardless of the parties' relative wealth, the resources that one side is 
willing to commit to the investigation can greatly exceed what the 
other side is willing to commit. 
Most notably, there are the "repeat players" who look at the sig-
nificance of one case, and the information developed upon investiga-
tion, with an eye to similar cases simultaneously pending or likely to 
arise in the future. 34 Because of the repeat player's ability to spread 
fixed costs of litigation over many cases, this may lead to investigation 
outlays that would seem out of proportion to the economic value of 
the particular case, a rational calculation that is not necessarily 
matched by the other side. Class actions are a partial answer; gener-
ally speaking, they allow the aggregating of simultaneous claims. 
Similarly, the importance of information to similarly situated 
nonrepeat players over time is partially registered by law firm speciali-
zation, which attracts litigants based partly upon the accumulation of 
relevant information. Although it is hard to make a judgment about 
the net effect of these mechanisms, I doubt that they fully eliminate 
the disparities in available investigation resources. 35 
Formal discovery is no answer to this problem. 36 While it is true 
that discovery in principle renders much of the products of one 
party's investigation available to the other, at least in civil cases, this 
forms (part of) the solution to the problem of evidence suppression, 
more so than that of unfound evidence. 37 The problem addressed 
here is not that one side has information the other does not, but rather 
that in their respective investigations, litigants do not seek relevant 
information that is "random" with respect to the side it favors. 
Though what a litigant seeks is not necessarily what he finds, it is still 
34 See generally Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974). 
35 See R. POSNER, supra note 27, at 536-37 (analyzing limitations on effectiveness of class 
actions). As far as law firm specialization is concerned, the mechanism obviously suffers from 
the problem of the willingness of the first n litigants to suffer losses in order to build the 
necessary information base to allow litigant n + 1 to at least match, effectively, the resources of 
the opposing repeat player. 
36 Indeed, one could imagine an optimal system as one in which the party in the best 
position to undertake a given investigation (that is, at least cost) would do so, but the resulting 
information would be fully disclosed to the opponent. In such an optimal system, all investiga-
tion costs would ultimately be divided between the parties in such a way as to favor the win-
ning party to a greater extent the clearer the case is. Arguably, any case proceeding to trial, 
despite restrictions on frivolous complaints or defenses and the availability of summary dispo-
sition methods, is sufficiently close as to warrant an equal division of total investigation costs. 
37 But see infra note 44. 
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unlikely that investigational strategies are entirely neutral in the sense 
of developing information which is representative of the universe of 
potential information. So even if all that the "wealthier" party devel-
ops were released to his opponent, it would not assure that the effect 
of resource imbalance would be neutralized. 
Assuming this to be correct, there are strong arguments in favor 
of further measures to reduce the effects of the imbalance in some 
way, at least in civil cases.38 The greater resource commitment results 
in development of potential evidence in a way that does not reflect a 
fair, or random, sampling of that potential. Of course, the argument 
is incomplete, for one cannot immediately conclude that this skewing 
will lead verdicts away from the truth; all one can conclude is that 
"wealthier" parties, as defined by the previous arguments, will tend to 
win more often that poorer parties, ceteris paribus. In order then to 
conclude that the skewing will reduce accuracy, one must add some 
proposition such as that wealthier parties are in the (legal) right on 
the substantive merits no more often than poorer parties, ceteris 
paribus. Perhaps this is a "social" assumption that we must make 
until otherwise demonstrated, or perhaps even if otherwise demon-
strated. Extant discussions make the assumption tacitly, but recog-
nize the difficulty of drawing implications for particular cases. 39 
The effect of measures to counteract resource differentials de-
pends upon the details of the proposed scheme of equalization. In 
civil cases, one can imagine a judicially supervised investigation cost 
limit, equally divided between parties, which could be increased as the 
litigation proceeds. Presumably, the limit for each litigant would 
have to be determined by some measure of the seriousness of the con-
38 It is, of course, probable that part of the reason for the burdens of proof and procedural 
constraints placed upon the prosecution in criminal cases is to offset the effects of resource 
imbalance. Illustrative, if somewhat dated, is Justice Black's statement concerning the prohi-
bition of double jeopardy, which operates to bar prosecutions in a way that is stronger than the 
corresponding effect of res judicata in civil cases: 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American 
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should 
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing 
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (retrial on charge of first-degree murder 
precluded by reversal of conviction for lesser included offense of second-degree murder). 
39 See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note 33, at 304-05 ("In arguing for [equalization of legal 
resources in civil cases], I mean to argue not for numerical equalization, but for whatever 
regulative principle would maximize the attainment of just results, knowing full well that it 
will be impossible to 'micromanage' things so as to guarantee a just result in every case, and 
that the specification of that regulative principle will require complex empirical 
investigation."). 
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troversy, perhaps the lesser of the projected investigation costs pro-
vided by the two parties at any given time. (Because of the difficulty 
of identifying the alignment of interests, more complicated formulae 
would probably be needed for cases with more than two parties.) This 
would mean that the party unwilling or unable to expend as much as 
her opponent would be able to place a ceiling on the opponent's ef-
forts. While this would create a superficially attractive equivalence, it 
would induce strategic underinvestigation by the party who perceives 
that she has the most to lose from further information coming to 
light. Such problems could be minimized by imposing a more "objec-
tive" limit, one not determined (solely) by the parties' perceptions of 
the importance of the case, but possibly related to the parties' re-
sources. Nevertheless, the process for setting and adjusting such a 
limit would still be affected by notice and hearing mechanisms that 
would provide the opportunity for strategic as well as honest com-
plaints by one party of inability to expand investigation. This in tum 
would require that the trial judge be able to waive actual equivalence 
in cases where that appears necessary in order to obtain information 
the importance of which is worth expenditure beyond a party's 
ceiling.40 
Alternatively, instead of trying to constrain the expenditures of 
the "wealthier" party, one could try to increase the resources avail-
able to the "poorer" party. For example, one could allow a party to 
exceed his investigation limit on the condition that he make a match-
ing deposit with the court in the amount of the excess, allowing the 
opponent to draw on that fund for investigation purposes, with any-
thing remaining in the fund after the close of the litigation being re-
turned to its contributor. That would preserve equivalence, since the 
opponent would have no incentive not to use the deposited money, 
but it would mean that the first party would face a distorted investiga-
tion cost function that doubled his marginal costs. Some degree of 
underinvestigation would continue and be especially serious when the 
wealthier party is in a better position, wealth aside, to make the 
needed investigation. This could be avoided by using taxpayers' 
money, rather than the opponent's, to raise the "poorer" litigant's re-
sources. Both approaches would leave the subsidized litigant with in-
centives to expend the available money regardless of its contribution 
to the fact-finding task and would thus pose the reverse problem of 
40 The significance of this kind of problem should not be underestimated. It would be quite 
common for the wealthier party to be a defendant with superior access to information that is 
expensive to produce. A limitation placed upon the defendant's expenditures in such a case 
could present serious problems of underinvestigation which the trial judge would be called 
upon to alleviate. 
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overinvestigation. The latter problem could be avoided by giving the 
subsidy to the "poorer" party outright, with no condition that it be 
spent on investigation or other litigation expenses. The litigant would 
then have the same incentives to conserve resources as would be true 
with regard to her own money. However, the availability of such sub-
sidies would create a serious incentive to make frivolous claims, per-
haps even collusive ones, pursued not for the sake of success in the 
litigation but only to obtain the subsidy. Besides such practical 
problems, public subsidy would raise serious political issues.41 
Combinations of the two principal approaches can be imagined 
as well, both limiting the expenditures of the wealthier party and sub-
sidizing the poorer party at taxpayers' or opponents' expense. In 
principle, the formula could be constructed so as to equalize litigation 
expenditures without increasing the aggregate, which might deflect 
criticism arising from the suspicion that the scheme is designed only 
to subsidize lawyers. It would, however, create the likelihood of un-
derinvestigation by the wealthier party and otherwise suffer from the 
combined practical difficulties associated with each component 
strategy. 
Nonsystemic Responses 
In the absence of systemic change altering the methods of fund-
ing or the adversarial character of civil and criminal litigation, the law 
has generated more modest responses to underinvestigation in partic-
ular contexts. The preferential exclusionary rules mentioned earlier 
constitute one line of response. For example, the hearsay rule pro-
vides incentives for the proponent of an out-of-court declaration to 
find and present the declarant to testify, and the creation of this incen-
tive is not an accidental by-product of the exclusionary rule.42 Simi-
larly, the rules of authentication and identification, especially as 
applied in criminal cases, induce greater expenditure on the creation 
of information concerning the history of tangible evidence.43 The list 
of examples can, of course, be multiplied.44 
41 Judge Frankel may be right in suggesting that public financing of the administration of 
justice, including the expenses of representation by attorneys, is more justifiable than that of 
most other goods routinely subsidized by the state. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 29, at 124-
25. It hardly seems likely, however, that increasing litigation expenditures, and thereby subsi-
dizing, or being perceived as subsidizing, lawyers, will be taken as a high priority for public 
spending policy, either at the state or federal level, notwithstanding empirical evidence that 
our society is not really overly litigious. See Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 
46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). 
42 See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 281-83. 
43 See Nance, Conditional Relevance, supra note 16, at 484-88. 
44 Exclusion as a sanction for noncompliance with a discovery order sometimes bears a 
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Although it will often be true that such rules merely encourage a 
party to present evidence already within its possession or control, 
sometimes the effect is to increase the commitment of resources to the 
acquisition or development of specific evidence. Whether or not in-
vestigation is encouraged turns on the conditions upon which the ap-
plication of exclusionary rules is excused. For example, if the 
additional information, such as the details of a chain of custody, is not 
readily avaiiabie to be presented at trial, and if the exclusionary rule is 
nonetheless applied, then the rule is aimed at modifying the investiga-
tive behavior of the proponent. Generally, the exclusionary rules are 
not excused simply by the proponent's not having the preferred evi-
dence at immediate disposal at time of trial, so it is safe to say that 
these rules are intended, in an interpretive sense, to have some impact 
on the commitment of resources to investigation.-~5 If so, it is plausi-
ble that such prophylactic rules will increase proponents' expendi-
tures, at least with regard to the kinds of matter in question.46 
When no such exclusionary rule can be brought to bear, tribunals 
are often forced to decide whether, notwithstanding the apparent in-
adequacy of the investigation, the applicable burden of proof has been 
met. For example, in People v. Park,47 the defendant appealed an un-
lawful possession conviction that was based principally upon a deputy 
sheriff's testimony, and the defendant's alleged oral confession, that 
the possessed substance was marijuana. The Supreme Court of Illi-
nois held that the sheriff's testimony, premised on his supposed famil-
iarity with marijuana's "feel, smell, texture, and looks" did not 
qualify as expert opinion.48 The court further held that without the 
sheriff's testimony there was insufficient evidence to support the con-
viction, a holding pointedly supported by taking judicial notice of 
highly reliable and readily available tests for the presence of canna-
relation, though rather different, to the problem of unfound evidence. To the extent that dis-
covery of what one's opponent intends to use at trial allows one to make further investigations 
toward impeachment or rebuttal that would not otherwise have been made, such discovery and 
associated sanctions operate in favor of the party whose investigation the law wants to assist. 
See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (preclusion of testimony by defense witness 
whose identity was not disclosed to prosecution before trial). 
45 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (conditions under which a declarant is considered un-
available for purposes of hearsay exceptions conditioned upon unavailability); FED. R. Evm. 
1004 (excuses for not presenting the original of a document otherwise within the prohibition of 
the original document rule); and Nance, Conditional Relevance, supra note 16, at 492-97 (pro-
ponent's burden under authentication and identification rules). 
46 Of course, the party's total investigation efforts may not increase as a result, since the 
party may simply shift its allocations of given resources. 
47 72 Ill. 2d 203, 380 N.E.2d 795 (1978). 
48 /d. at 207-08, 380 N.E.2d at 797. 
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bis.49 Given the modern liberality in qualifying experts and the pre-
vailing deference to trial court determinations on such matters, 50 the 
weakness of the sheriff's testimony seems less important than the 
problem of missing evidence, in this case scientific evidence. Such a 
view is generally confirmed by subsequent interpretations of Park in 
the lower Illinois courts. 51 The rule is one of necessity in the presen-
tation of evidence. 52 
Of course, any ruling that the aggregate evidence is insufficient, 
to the extent it can be anticipated, puts pressure on the burdened 
party to present stronger proofs. But when particular evidence can be 
identified as missing, yet reasonably available, then it may be consid-
ered unreasonable to go forward to judgment in the face of any doubt 
that could be removed by presentation of that evidence. In a criminal 
case like Park, such doubt may constitute the "reasonable doubt" that 
warrants dismissal or acquittal, and this is so even if the same degree 
of doubt would not so warrant if the missing evidence were not rea-
sonably available. In some cases, that is, the failure to present the 
missing evidence seems to be decisive only when there is reason to 
think its absence could have been reasonably avoided. 53 It is often 
difficult to discern in such cases whether the significance of the miss-
ing evidence is to render the admitted evidence insufficient under a 
given measure of the burden of proof, or rather to constitute a sepa-
rate part of the burden applicable even when the admitted evidence, 
49 Jd. at 212-14, 380 N.E.2d at 799-801. 
5 0 See E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE). 
5 1 See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 96 Ill. App. 3d 880, 883, 422 N.E.2d 127, 129 (1981) (Park 
requires proof of results of chemical tests to support conviction, notwithstanding admission of 
less conclusive expert testimony); People v. Jackson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 785, 787, 481 N.E.2d 
1222, 1224 (1985) (not requiring tests of "every capsule or every gram of a substance"); People 
v. Little, 140 Ill. App. 3d 682, 684, 489 N.E.2d 322, 323-25 (1986) (dissenting opinion on 
question of how much should be requ\red of prosecution). Cf People v. Ortiz, 197 Ill. App. 3d 
250, 554 N.E.2d 416 (1990) (absence of available expert testimony not determinative where 
parties stipulated to admissibility of test report but not to the expertise of the reporter). 
52 Lawyers routinely contrast admissibility of evidence with weight or sufficiency of evi-
dence, weight being a concept directed to the evaluation of the evidence by the trier of fact, and 
sufficiency being a concept directed to the judiciary's supervision of fact finding. See, e.g., 
FED. R. Evm. 104(e). Logicians, who rarely need speak of admissibility, routinely distinguish 
between necessity and sufficiency of propositions or evidence. The two distinctions are, of 
course, related: What we are concerned with here is the question of whether certain evidence 
that would be admissible is necessary in order for the total package of evidence presented to be 
sufficient to satisfy the applicable burden of proof 
53 Eg., compare People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 380 N.E.2d 795 (1978) with United States v. 
Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 970 (1976) (conviction sus-
tained upon DEA agent testimony identifYing, as cocaine, substance never available for test-
ing) and People v. Jones, 75 Ill. App. 3d 214, 393 N.E.2d 1132 (1979) (chemical test not 
required if adequate circumstantial evidence exists; substance not available for testing). 
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after appropriate discounting, is sufficient to meet the usual standard. 
This ambiguity is partly a consequence of the inherent flexibility of 
the reasonable doubt standard itself. 54 Particularly in criminal cases, 
the latter idea is more clearly invoked when the issue is addressed not 
as an ordinary question of the sufficiency of the evidence but as a 
question of whether conviction on an unnecessarily impoverished rec-
ord violates the guarantee of due process of law. 55 
The issue arises in civil cases as well, as illustrated by the contro-
versy over the sufficiency of so-called "naked statistical evidence" of 
liability. Hostility toward reliance upon such evidence is probably, if 
partially, a product of the belief that such evidence is almost never the 
only available evidence on the issue. 56 This means that even if we 
accept a fixed mathematical probability (for example, greater than .50 
Pascalian probability) as the basic interpretation of the preponderance 
of evidence standard in civil cases, it would not necessarily be unrea-
sonable to nonsuit a plaintiff who has established a .51 probability 
that defendant is liable when the plaintiff could reasonably have 
presented evidence that would have either increased or decreased the 
probability or increased our confidence in the estimate thereof. 57 And 
this is so even if the evidence, suitably discounted for the omission, still 
shows a probability greater than .50 that defendant is liable. The phe-
nomenon can also be found at work in less overtly statistical cases. 58 
This kind of pressure on parties to produce missing evidence is 
not always exerted against the party with the burden of persuasion. 
54 On the reasonable doubt standard and its relation to completeness of evidence, see gen-
erally Cohen, The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U.L. REV. 635 (1986) and 
Kaye, Do We Need a Calculus of Weight to Understand Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 66 
B.U.L. REV. 657 (1986). 
55 Compare Garcia v. District Court, 197 Colo. 38, 589 P.2d 924 (1979) (due process viola-
tion) with State v. Reyna, 92 Idaho 669, 448 P.2d 762 (1968) (no due process violation). See 
also United States v. Martinez, 744 F.2d 76, 79-80 (lOth Cir. 1984) (government's failure to 
perform scientific tests that might generate exculpatory evidence did not warrant dismissal on 
constitutional grounds, but would go to weight and sufficiency of evidence). 
56 See Kaye, The Paradox of the Gacecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 
104-08; Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U.L. 
REv. 439, 454-62 (1986). 
57 Cf. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect 
Knowledge, 60 N.Y. U. L. REv. 385 (1985) (confidence in estimates of probability as relevant 
part of the burden of persuasion). 
5 8 See, e.g., Warren v. Jeffries, 263 N.C. 531, 533, 139 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1965) (noting 
failure to inspect condition of car involved in accident in ruling evidence of negligence insuffi-
cient). This may be the right way to understand a civil case that has generated much discus-
sion. See Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945) (directing a 
verdict for defendant where plaintiff had failed to present evidence excluding other plausible 
persons as the negligent actor). Cf In re R.D., 178 Ill. App. 3d 681, 533 N.E. 2d 1121 (1989) 
(Park notwithstanding, expert testimony is not required in delinquency proceeding where bur-
den of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence.). 
1991] MISSING EVIDENCE 849 
The point is obvious with regard to the preferential exclusionary 
rules, as they apply quite generally to both parties. Moreover, it is not 
uncommon to see the burden of production shifted to the other party 
because of the latter's superior access to the missing evidence. This is 
standard fare, for example, in the application of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. 59 In criminal cases, constitutional limitations necessi-
tate dealing with such problems by placing the initial burden on the 
defendant by way of specifying affirmative defenses, a practice also 
common in civillaw.60 
It is my suspicion that the number of these sufficiency rulings is 
large, though they are often to be found within the lower echelons of 
local practice, developed in a manner seemingly peculiar to particular 
substantive fields, or conceived less as rules of law than as rules of 
thumb in the application of general standards. 61 With the gradual 
deemphasis of admissibility, and the statutory restriction on judicial 
promulgation of exclusionary rules, 62 these ideas may come to have 
an increasing prominence in the field of evidence law. This may or 
may not be a happy development. It would be wise for the law to be 
more self-conscious in its choice whether to employ admissibility or 
sufficiency rules in this context. 63 The use of admissibility rules is less 
59 See generally I S. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: REs IPSA LOQUITUR §§ 2:26-:28 
(1972). In many jurisdictions, the inference is said to arise when additional evidence of negli-
gence, if any, is practically accessible to the defendant but not to the plaintiff. /d. § 2:26, at 84. 
This doctrine raises two possibilities: either the concept of accessibility is intended to be a 
relative one, such that the evidence is not practically accessible if it is more easily available to 
the other side; or, it is intended to be independent of the ease with which one's adversary can 
present the evidence. Under the former interpretation of the indicated doctrine, the inference 
may be available in contexts of unfound, rejected, or suppressed evidence while under the 
latter interpretation, the inference may not be available in cases of rejected evidence. 
60 The pivotal criminal case is Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (permitting 
burden of persuasion to be placed upon defendant for an issue which, if it had been made part 
of the prosecution's case, could not constitutionally be made the subject of a burden-shifting 
presumption). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW§§ 1.8 (c), 2.13 (2d ed. 
1986) (the assignment of an issue to defendant as an affirmative defense is a plausible response 
to the "impossible burden on the prosecution to establish the existence of facts within the 
special knowledge of the defendant." /d. at 56). 
61 Obvious exceptions are occasionally encountered asperse rules on the sufficiency of 
evidence, such as the rule requiring corroboration of confessions. See McCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE, supra note 50, § 145. 
62 See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (refusing to recognize com-
mon-law strictures on admission of prior crimes evidence not codified in the Federal Rules). 
See generally, Imwinkelried, The Meaning Of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 898 (1988). 
63 For an example of such self-consciousness in the specific context of hearsay evidence, see 
Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495 (1987) (considering the use of 
sufficiency doctrine, inter alia, in handling admitted hearsay). Professor Swift's analysis is 
somewhat marred, for our purposes, by her assumption that abolishing the hearsay admissibil-
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severe as a response to unfound evidence, since it leaves open the pos-
sibility that the adversely affected party can win without the excluded 
evidence, as well as the possibility of avoiding the exclusion by 
presenting the missing evidence before the proofs are closed. Perhaps, 
therefore, admissibility rules are more appropriate for dealing with 
the less egregious omissions. 
A Tentative Conclusion 
Neither the problem of unfound evidence nor its near cousin 
problem of nonrepresentativeness of found information seems serious 
enough to warrant the extremely difficult administrative tasks associ-
ated with the kind of systemic responses discussed above. Most im-
portantly, in each case a trial judge would have to sort through claims 
and counterclaims ancillary to the merits of the dispute, concerning 
the resources available to the parties, litigation economies of scale, 
and so forth. Assuming a realistic formula for modifying available 
resources could be legislated, 64 the courts would be further plagued by 
accusations and counter-accusations concerning whether an investiga-
tion limit has been exceeded, with whatever consequences that may 
entail. It is likely that the judiciary would be dragged inexorably into 
the detailed administration of the evidence gathering process. 
Whether we should go down this potentially nonadversarial road 
raises issues going beyond the scope of this paper. In making such a 
decision, however, we should not forget about the "present or excuse" 
rules of admissibility or sufficiency which can be used to target partic-
ular areas where our expectations are that better evidence is reason-
ably available to a party, or at least to most parties similarly situated. 
These relatively nonsystemic responses serve to remind litigants of the 
need for certain evidence. Of course, though valuable as guidance for 
the litigant who has the resources to produce the preferred evidence, 
such legal responses do not directly address the problem of resource 
shortage. However, the resource demands imposed by many, indeed 
most, such preferences are usually modest, and where they become 
onerous it is not uncommon for the rule to be excused, either by ex-
plicit exception or, less obviously, by its not being imposed in the first 
place. 65 The existing flexibility in such doctrines can thus accommo-
ity rule somehow entails rejection of "all judicial treatment of hearsay as a special category of 
evidence," id. at 495, including sufficiency rules for hearsay, e.g. id. at 506 n.29, 512. 
64 It is extremely difficult to imagine the judiciary's imposing such a formula without legis-
lative guidance. 
65 The notion of conditional relevance, and the associated doctrines of authentication and 
identification, exemplify the latter mechanism. See generally Nance, Conditional Relevance, 
supra note 16. 
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date, to a limited extent, remaining resource differentials. Moreover, 
in the context of criminal prosecutions, exclusion of evidence or dis-
missal of the case may be a more effective way to divert resources to 
the matter of evidentiary concern than a general increase in resources 
made available to prosecution and (public) defense, a way to do so 
that does not require the judiciary to confront directly the issue of 
legislative control over spending. 
REJECTED EVIDENCE 
The problem of evidence available to both parties, but voluntarily 
not presented by either of them, calls for a rather different kind of 
analysis. At first blush, this would seem like the perfect opportunity 
to apply adversarial logic: If both parties can present the evidence, 
but neither party does, why should the law care about its content? 
The answer implicit in this rhetorical question might be correct if the 
object of rules of procedure were simply to guarantee a "fair contest" 
between the parties.66 And the general reluctance of the law to over-
ride the parties' rejection seems to confirm that conception of things. 
That is not the end of the matter, however. Though the law is 
generally content to allow the parties "collectively" to choose not to 
present evidence, there are exceptions. Most obviously, the well-es-
tablished practice of allowing the trial judge to call and interrogate 
witnesses or to ask questions of witnesses called by the parties illus-
trates the law's willingness to intervene to provide the trier of fact 
with a more complete view of the available evidence than the parties, 
with full and mutual access thereto, would otherwise choose to pres-
ent. 67 There are many truth-threatening motives that may lead to the 
necessity of such intervention. For example, 
This problem frequently arises in practice. A person may possess 
highly relevant knowledge but have such an unsavory background 
and be so easily impeached that neither party wants to call him as 
a witness; they both may fear that if the jury associates them with 
that witness, the jury's suspicions about the witness will spill over 
66 See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, supra note 23, at 1-6. Professor Landsman acknowledges that 
the fair contest is simply a means to the end of a resolution of the dispute "acceptable to the 
parties and to society." Jd. at 2. Elsewhere, however, he clarifies that an "acceptable" resolu-
tion should not be premised upon maximal accuracy in the determination of disputed factual 
issues, because preoccupation with accuracy is "naive" and "futile" and could lead to "unsa-
vory abuses" such as the use of torture. Jd. at 36-37. 
67 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 614. To be sure, acceptance of this practice has not been easily 
obtained, given the adversarial preference for a neutral and passive trial court. See generally 9 
J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§§ 2483, 2484 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (expressing impatience with 
common-Jaw judicial reluctance to call and interrogate witnesses). 
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and impair the credibility of their other witnesses. 68 
Moreover, it is almost invariably the case that if the trial judge has the 
ability to call or question a witness, each of the parties has that ability 
as well, though they will have chosen not to exercise that capacity in 
the manner contemplated by the judge. 69 Thus, the judicial calling or 
examination of witnesses is, in practice, a response to the problem of 
what we have called rejected evidence. 70 
As in the case of unfound evidence, admissibility rules and rul-
ings may also be affected by the failure to present evidence, even when 
the evidence in question is reasonably available to the opposition. 
Our preferential exclusionary rules are not generally excused by a 
showing that the preferred evidence, whether it be the original of a 
document, the testimony of a hearsay declarant, or authenticating evi-
dence for a tangible thing, could be introduced by the opponent.71 In 
view of adversarial motivations, it might not be a disaster if they were 
so excusable, relying on the judicial power to present evidence to deal 
withjoint reluctance of the parties. Yet the law has not viewed this as 
an adequate arrangement, partly in order to avoid dealing with the 
question of the opponent's capacity to produce the evidence and 
partly out of preference for a response to missing evidence that does 
not threaten the passivity of the trial judge in the information-gather-
ing function. 72 The question of the proper form of intervention is 
often a delicate one, but it is nonetheless important to recognize that 
some form of intervention in the operation of the adversarial contest 
68 R. CARLSON, E. lMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 77 (3d ed. 
1991). Similarly, unprivileged evidence may be favorable to one side, yet too embarrassing to 
be presented by that party, a fact that may even induce extortionate behavior by the opponent. 
69 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948). Johnson was a Jones Act case in 
which plaintiff recovered for injuries despite a failure to call crucial witness equally and readily 
available to both parties. A strong dissent was filed on grounds that the trial judge should have 
called the missing witness. !d. at SO (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
70 See McCORMiCK ON EviDENCE, supra note SO, § 8, at 16-17 (noting typical uses of 
judicial power to call unsavory witnesses and neutral experts). Of course, the recognition of 
the authority of the trial judge to intervene is invariably coupled with warnings about its abuse. 
Id. at lS-16. 
71 On occasion, the exclusion may be excused by the fact that the preferred evidence is 
comparatively easier for the opponent to present. An example is the rule that the original of a 
document need not be presented to prove its contents if the original is in the possession of the 
opponent and the opponent has notice of the intended use of secondary evidence. See, e.g., 
FED. R. Evm. 1004(3). It should, however, be noted that this excuse does not apply when the 
original is readily and equl).lly available to the parties, as when it is in the possession of a 
neutral third person readily accessible to both. Similarly, a party can introduce a hearsay 
statement made by the opponent, but not ordinarily one made by a neutral third person who is 
readily available to the opponent. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2) (defining party admis-
sions as nonhearsay). 
72 See generally Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 
64 VA. L. REV. I (1978) (emphasizing importance of judicial passivity). 
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may be necessary, even in the paradigmatic situation here presented, 
in order simply to educate the parties as to the importance of over-
looked evidence or to overcome tactical disincentives to the presenta-
tion of useful evidence. 73 
Sufficiency rules serving a similar function have also been around 
for a long time, like the rule in certain jurisdictions requiring the pros-
ecution to identify and present all known res gestae witnesses. 74 As in 
the context of unfound evidence, in many cases it is difficult to know 
to what extent a sufficiency ruling entails such a distinct "rule" of 
general applicability, applying even if the usual standard for the bur-
den of production has been satisfied, as opposed to being merely an 
application of the usual standard affected by the missing evidence. 75 
In other cases, it is difficult to tell whether the ruling is indeed one 
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole or rather one 
concerning admissibility of other evidence that is presented. An inter-
esting and controversial example of the both ambiguities is a decision 
concerning the use at trial of physical evidence as well as expert testi-
mony about the thing in question. It bears close examination. 
In G.E.G. v. State/6 the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
"when a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled sub-
stance, that substance, if available, must be introduced into evidence 
but that a defendant who fails to object to its nonintroduction may 
not be heard to complain of the error on appeal."77 The rule thus 
allows the defendant to insist upon the presentation of tangible evi-
dence in addition to the testimony of an expert who reports an analy-
73 See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 263-70 (the adversary argument against 
preferential rules depends not only upon "(i) access by the opponent to the better evidence," 
but also on "(ii) absence of legal or tactical obstacles to the opponent's presentation of this 
evidence, (iii) sufficient diligence by the opponent's counsel in obtaining and presenting the 
better evidence, and (iv) adequacy of a subsequent counter-presentation"). 
74 See, e.g., People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 367, 40 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1949) (reversing 
conviction for failure of prosecution to call eyewitness, notwithstanding claim that witness was 
available to defense, relying upon "duty of the prosecution to show the whole transaction as it 
was, regardless of whether it tends to establish guilt or innocence"). Similar rules have devel-
oped in connection with hearings on the voluntariness of confessions. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 
414 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 1982); People v. Armstrong, 51 Ill. 2d 471, 476, 282 N.E.2d 712, 715 
(1972). 
75 See, e.g., Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234-35, 196 N.E. 36, 38-39 (1935) (plaintiff 
failed to meet burden in car accident case by not calling defendants, both of whom were closely 
related to plaintiff and who were in the best position to know the cause of the accident). The 
result suggests concern about collusion between plaintiff and defendants to obtain liability in-
surance benefits. 
76 417 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1982). 
77 I d. at 977. The actual result in the case was to affirm the adjudication of defendant's 
delinquency because defendant had not made a proper objection or otherwise put the trial 
court on notice of the error in question. !d. at 978. 
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sis of the substance in question. Significantly, the latter evidence was 
presented in the case and is itself generally necessary for a conviction 
under Florida law.78 Moreover, the substance itself was in fact read-
ily available to both the prosecution and the defense and, thus, consti-
tutes an example of rejected evidence. 79 On first reading of the 
opinion, it is not easy to say whether the central issue is one of the 
necessity of the tangible evidence in order to satisfy the burden of 
proof, or the necessity of the tangible evidence to support the admis-
sion of the expert testimony. The two questions collapse into one of 
sufficiency if indeed the testimony of the expert is itself necessary to 
the conviction. 80 Nevertheless, there is considerable discussion in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions of ideas usually associated 
with admissibility rules. 
The majority offers, and the dissent disputes, three arguments 
with regard to the announced rule. 81 In an apparent reply to the pros-
ecution's hornbook argument that the 'best evidence' rule, a rule of 
admissibility, applies only to writings, 82 the majority quotes Black-
stone on the classic best evidence notion83 and then continues: "In 
78 The expert testimony was provided by a chemist. Id. at 977. The separate opinion in 
the case observes: 
To prove that an object found in the possession of the accused is a controlled 
substance, the state must present the testimony of a qualified expert. The testi-
mony of a non-expert, based on simple observation, will not be enough to establish 
whether an object is a controlled substance under [Florida law]. 
Id. at 979 (Boyd, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Cf. People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 380 
N.E.2d 795 (1978), described supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. 
79 "The substance was actually present during every moment of the trial and was handled, 
examined, and referred to by the prosecutor and the state's witnesses." G.E.G., 417 So. 2d at 
977 n.2. Needless to say, subsequent litigation has focused on the exact nature of the availabil-
ity premise. See, e.g., Morra v. State, 467 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming 
conviction where substance was excluded on defense motion at trial because of possible tam-
pering after testing by state's expert). 
80 Although there is some authority to the contrary, it has been said to be the overwhelm-
ing majority view, and the better view, that the chain of custody must only be established to 
the expert whose testimony is based on the substance analyzed, rather than to the courtroom. 
See Imwinkelried, The Identification of Original, Real Evidence, 61 MILL. REv. 145, 155-56 
(1973). As a prerequisite to admission of the expert testimony, this would seem to be right, 
postanalysis tampering, for example, having no effect upon the validity of the expert's results. 
As a prerequisite to the introduction of the substance itself, however, there may need to be a 
further showing of custody to trial. Moreover, postanalysis tampering could, in a given case, 
conceal evidence of preanalysis tampering, so a requirement of postanalysis chain of custody as 
a condition of admissibility of the results of analysis may be a wise prophylactic measure. 
81 The court eschews reliance upon the defendant's confrontation rights, but otherwise is 
silent on the question of its reliance upon constitutional norms. G.E.G., 417 So. 2d at 977 n.2. 
82 The argument is emphasized by the dissenting and concurring opinion. Id. at 979 
(Boyd, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
83 The quotation is as follows: 
[T]he one general rule that runs through all the doctrine of trials is this-that the 
best evidence the nature of the case will admit of shall always be required, if possi-
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Florida the 'best evidence rule' only applies to writings, recordings, 
and photographs. But the fact that we are no longer fettered by the 
letter of Blackstone's words hardly implies that we are not free to be 
persuaded by their spirit. " 84 The majority then offers two practical 
considerations favoring required introduction. First, failure to re-
quire production of the substance, if it is available and if the defense 
so insists, would create a risk of prosecutorial abuse, because the pros-
ecutor's option to present or not "could deliberately or unwittingly be 
used to confuse defense counsel and thwart the ability to make certain 
objections, particularly objections to chain of custody."85 This argu-
ment presupposes that the defense is not astute enough to object at the 
time the expert testimony is offered. Attorneys, like most people, be-
ing creatures of habit, it may not be unreasonable to assume that at 
least some would await the expected proffer of the analyzed sub-
stance. 86 Second, the prosecution's failure to introduce the substance 
"might put the defendant in the awkward position of introducing it 
himself should he wish to challenge its authenticity where there has 
been testimony of its existence as here."87 A defendant may well be 
understandably reluctant to inject into the proceedings a substance so 
associated with social ills as to generate criminal sanctions for its 
mere possession. 88 
This was a hard case, and the wisdom of the announced rule is 
certainly debatable. 89 For our purposes, it is not necessary to endorse 
the result but only to appreciate the nature of reasoning ultimately 
ble to be had; but, if not possible, then the best evidence that can be had shall be 
allowed. For if it be found that there is any better evidence existing than is pro-
duced, the very not producing it is a presumption that it would have detected some 
falsehood that at present is concealed. 
Jd. at 977 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368) (footnote omitted). 
84 Id. (footnote omitted). 
ss Id. 
86 "A defense attorney might wait for the proper moment for an objection, the moment 
when the state offers the substance into evidence, only to find that the moment never arrives 
because the state has exercised its discretion in favor of non-introduction." I d. at 977-78. The 
dissent replies that "the jury, if defense counsel does his job correctly, will not see the evidence 
nor even hear it referred to unless and until it has been ruled admissible by the court." Id. at 
980. 
87 /d. at 978. This could occur, for example, if the appearance of the substance or its 
container suggests a problem in the chain of custody from seizure to expert analysis. 
88 This point may serve to distinguish the class of cases covered by the announced rule 
from cases involving tangible evidence that is not of an inherently inflammatory nature. How-
ever, it is not clear that the rule will be interpreted that narrowly. Cf Fletcher v. State, 472 
So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (distinguishing G. E. G. v. State on the different 
ground that the res, an alleged razor blade, was not recovered by police and, therefore, was 
never available to the prosecution). 
89 A directly contrary holding, more briefly defended, is Watson v. State, 18 Md. App. 184, 
195, 306 A.2d 599, 606-07 (1973). See also Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of 
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instantiated, namely that fairness to parties is not enough when there 
is a threat to the accuracy of the proceedings. One could try to recast 
the opinion as one of pure fairness to the defense, and indeed the ma-
jority's opinion probably intended to convey that message as well. It 
hardly seems unfair, however, to hold even a criminal defendant re-
sponsible for the choices that must be made by defense counsel under 
the hypothetical risks described by the court, unless what is unfair 
about the situation is just the increased risk of inaccuracy.90 The ma-
jority's reliance upon a general best evidence principle coheres well 
with its practical concerns over the administration of the chain of cus-
tody requirement, which in turn is based upon such a principle. 
Finally, the most common device for the control of the parties' 
rejection of evidence is the employment of adverse inferences to be 
drawn from the failure of a party to present the missing evidence. 
There is a substantial though confusing body of law concerning the 
use of such inferences, argued by a party, possibly supported by a jury 
instruction, and usually said to be premised on the probability that 
the missing evidence would be unfavorable to a party who consciously 
chooses not to present it. 91 The practice, however, raises an impor-
tant question: Against whom is the inference to operate, given our 
assumption that the missing evidence is reasonably available to both 
parties?92 There are several possibilities, each of which has support in 
the case law. 
One conventional view is that the inference is allowed against the 
Real Evidence, 20 AM. CR!M. L. REV. 527, 540-42 (1983) (criticizing rule in G.E.G. v. State in 
context of discussion of admissibility issues, with passing reference to sufficiency issues). 
90 The decision was not explicitly based upon avoiding potential claims of ineffective assist-
ance of defense counsel, though the first of the two rationales given could conceivably have 
been cast in this fashion. In that respect, however, the requirement of prejudice to defendant 
means not just a decision less favorable to defendant than would otherwise have occurred, but 
one less reliable than would otherwise have been. See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. 
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 795-800, 806-17 (2d ed. 1986). 
9 1 See generally McCoRMICK ON EviDENCE, supra note 50, § 272. By judicial decision, 
one state has banned the use of adverse inferences for failure to present evidence, at least in 
criminal cases where the missing evidence is the testimony of a witness. See State v. Brewer, 
505 A.2d 774 (Me. 1985). It should, however, be noted that the ruling was made in a case 
where the missing witness seems to have been readily available to both defense and prosecution 
and the inference was argued against the defendant. Moreover, the court discusses the ambi-
guity of any inference under the particular facts and suggests constitutional concerns with 
regard to the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 776-77. 
92 In some formulations of the missing evidence instruction, an adverse inference is not 
specifically authorized unless the missing evidence is not reasonably available to the party to be 
benefitted by the inference. See, e.g., 3 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRAC-
TICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (4th ed. 1987). Depending upon the interpretation to be 
given "reasonably available" in such formulations the inference may be legitimate only in sup-
pression cases. 
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party whom, a priori, the missing evidence would ordinarily be as-
sumed to favor. 93 This view continues to be informed by the idea of 
trying to guess which party would be favored by the missing evidence 
if presented, often a strikingly speculative endeavor. If one eschews 
this difficult task, it does not necessarily mean that one should give up 
the use of such inferences, for the point may be seen as assuring that 
the missing evidence is in fact produced.94 If so, and one is prepared 
to talk about relative accessibility of the missing evidence, then the 
inference should operate against the party with superior access, that 
is, the party for whom it is easier to present the evidence in court. 95 
If, on the other hand, one believes that discovery is sufficiently effec-
tive as to make it pointless to try to cut the matter so finely, then the 
inference should operate against the party with the burden of proof 
generally, with due acknowledgment that placing such burdens is 
often, to some extent, a function of access to evidence generally.96 
Hybrid solutions are possible as well, for example, placing the burden 
of production associated with the inference upon the party with the 
burden of persuasion, except when the missing evidence is the testi-
mony of the opponent or a person identified with the opponent. 
Under all but the first indicated view, it is clear that the law's 
response is not then simply a logical inference from the omission to 
the probable content of the omitted evidence, but rather a penalty 
imposed for the nonpresentation and inducement to present the evi-
dence. If the evidence is not then presented, a possibility of increased 
error is imposed for the improved long-run incentives. Consequently, 
when the adverse inference is used in this manner, the effect of the 
inference should be specified by the court according to the degree of 
leverage considered appropriate, rather than left to the vagaries of a 
supposed inference that is not really the point of the response. 
The common-law system of adjudication thus provides a surpris-
93 See McCoRMICK ON EviDENCE, supra note SQ, § 272, at 805-06 (under this view, the 
inference may indeed be argued by both parties). 
94 This suggestion is made in Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 27 (1984). 
Though his argument is questionable at points, Livermore rightly concludes that the court 
should first determine in each case whether the missing evidence should be presented and, only 
if so, upon whom to place the burden of production associated with the adverse inference. I d. 
at 28-29, 34-35, 40. 
95 The classic statement of the doctrine seems to employ this idea: 
[I]f a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testi-
mony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the 
presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable. 
Graves v. United States, !50 U.S. I 18, 121 (1893) (prosecution's comment on defendant's 
failure to produce wife for possible identification) (emphasis added). Modem cases are col-
lected at Livermore, supra note 94, at 3 I n. I 8. 
96 Livermore, supra note 94, at 36-37. 
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ingly rich array of alternative responses to the problem of rejected 
evidence, a problem that might not seem serious enough to warrant 
the effort. That it is taken seriously by the law reflects, once again, 
the extent to which even our adversarial system is committed to accu-
racy of decision and the extent to which accuracy is thought to re-
quire a complete presentation of important, privileged evidence. 
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE 
There are many situations in which the law considers even the 
suppression of evidence, as broadly defined above, to be perfectly ac-
ceptable. Accordingly, we must distinguish at the outset legitimate 
from illegitimate suppression. After making some brief comments 
about this issue, we will look at the problem the law faces in dealing 
with illegitimate suppression. 
Legitimate and Illegitimate Suppression 
Three general categories of privileged suppression are identifi-
able.97 The first is the suppression of evidence incident to the mainte-
nance of privileges against compelled disclosure, recognized primarily 
to protect the confidentiality of certain relationships.98 No attempt 
will be made here to assess the conventional rules of privilege; their 
existence and justification will be taken as given. 99 
The second category consists of a set of informal privileges aris-
ing out of property and privacy rights and the economics of informa-
tion storage and embracing a right to destroy information or the 
physical embodiment thereof, provided of course the destruction does 
not involve breach of a distinct legal duty unrelated to evidentiary 
concerns, like the murder of a witness. This privilege depends consid-
erably upon the motives of the destroyer, as it applies, or should ap-
ply, only to someone who destroys for reasons other than obtaining a 
97 A fourth is sufficiently uncontroversial to be dropped to a footnote. A party is privi-
leged, even obligated, to suppress information that is of minimal significance to the litigation. 
This is a consequence of what I have called the "contractionary" component of the best evi-
dence principle, that parties have the responsibility to protect the tribunal from wasteful ex-
penditures of court resources. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 241-42, 273. 
Indeed, such evidence would be objectionable, if presented, under prohibitions such as FED. R. 
Evm. 403 (excluding evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"). 
98 See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 50, § 72, at 171. 
99 Their function and justification remain controversial. On the most important privileges, 
those attaching to the attorney-client relationship, compare Zacharias, Rethinking Confidenti-
ality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989) with Allen, Grady, Polsby & Yahsko, A Positive Theory of 
the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990). 
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tactical advantage in litigation. 100 Application of such a privilege im-
mediately generates the problem of mixed motives, especially in the 
context of the routine destruction plans that have proliferated in the 
corporate world in recent years. 101 In the context of destruction of 
evidence by law enforcement agencies, where the legitimate claims of 
property and privacy are radically diminished and the probable evi-
dentiary significance of information looms large, the law should be 
particularly strict on evidence destruction, though the courts have 
taken an irregular and confusing path in their supervision of govern-
mental practices. 102 
There is a third major reason to consider suppression legitimate. 
Arguably even more controversial than the previous two, it is difficult 
even to state in terms that would not be instantly subject to challenge 
and qualification. As a first approximation, let us say that one conse-
quence of the use of an adversarial system is the general notion that 
one need not take affirmative steps to help one's opponent. What this 
means in terms of information disclosure includes the proposition that 
a litigant is privileged to withhold evidence if his opponent has not 
used or has ineffectively used reasonable discovery mechanisms that 
would, if used, have led to the discovery of the evidence. Even this 
core of what may be called the quintessential "adversarial privilege" 
is subject to serious qualification under prevailing practice. In crimi-
nal cases, the prosecution is subject to a general duty of disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence;103 and more narrowly, in both criminal and 
100 See Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1140-43, 1183-91. Even in substantive law, the 
important zones of privilege protected by property and privacy rights are subject to limitations 
based upon considerations of motive, as is illustrated by the law of "spite fences." See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 829(a) (landowner may not build what would otherwise 
be a lawful structure for sole purpose of gratifying ill will against neighbor). 
101 See Oesterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's Inappropriate Destruction 
of Relevant Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1185-87 (1983). 
102 See Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1118-25, 1145-48. Part of the confusion arises 
from tensions inherent in the separation of unfound evidence problems r"rom suppression 
problems. If a party with unique access to evidence takes affirmative steps to destroy it or 
withhold it from an opponent, the law's responses to this paradigmatic suppression may be 
severe. If, however, the party, by its failure to invest significant further resources, merely 
allows information to be lost, then the law's usual reluctance to interfere with resource alloca-
tion competes with the suspicion generated by the choice of inaction. This ambivalence is 
illustrated by the many cases dealing with the failure of the prosecution to preserve evidence 
that might be favorable to the accused. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). The issue arises in civil cases when a party fails 
to prepare records of information that is consequently lost. See, e.g., Soria v. Ozinga Bros., 
704 F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1983). 
103 See generally C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 537-48. The duty 
applies notwithstanding that the evidence is readily available to the defense. See, e.g., Ander-
son v. South Carolina, 709 F.2d 887, 888 (4th Cir. 1983). It may be doubted, however, how 
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civil cases, the tribunal not infrequently asserts, usually by way of an 
exclusionary rule, its need for fuller information from the would-be 
suppressor, notwithstanding any failure of the opponent's discovery 
efforts. 104 
Moreover, it is arguable whether the privilege extends to with-
holding evidence that could not be discovered by the opponent's rea-
sonable use of available discovery processes. 105 If one views the 
opponent's formal discovery rights as intended to create and define 
the extent of a litigant's duty to disclose relevant information, then 
the indicated extension makes sense. If, more plausibly in some con-
texts, one views formal discovery as simply intended to help facilitate 
and enforce a litigant's preexisting duty in contexts where such en-
couragement is practicable, then there is no reason to make such an 
extension. 106 The privilege to suppress may be limited to situations 
where it can be concluded that the opponent should bear the risk of 
her own failures to discover the evidence in question, and for much 
the same reason that the law does not concern itself greatly with the 
possibility of missing evidence that is in the possession or control of 
the litigant favored by the evidence. 107 Again, hereafter we will take 
the resolution of these difficult matters largely as given, in order to 
focus on the consequences of illegitimate suppression. 
scrupulously this duty is honored in practice. See Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to 
an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982). 
104 Once again, the paradigin, but by no means only example is the original document rule, 
which requires the proponent of secondary evidence of the contents of a document to present 
the original, or. excuse its absence whether or not the opponent could have obtained access to 
the original and subpoenaed same. See generally Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 263-
70. 
105 Given the prosecution's disclosure duties, see supra note 103, this issue should be 
presented most often with regard to evidence in the possession or control of criminal defend-
ants. While there has been some movement toward disclosure by the defense, the requirements 
pertain mostly to evidence that the defense intends to present and is, therefore, aimed at avoid-
ing surprise and allowing the prosecution to counter claims, such as alibi and insanity, rather 
than at making available to the prosecution information that would otherwise never come to 
the prosecution's attention. See Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: 'Tilting the Adver-
sarial Balance, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1567 (1967). Of course, there continue to be gaps in discov-
ery even in civil cases. See, e.g., Cleary & Strong, The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in 
Context, 51 IOWA L. REv. 825, 835-45 (1966) (analyzing gaps with respect to discovery of 
documentary evidence). 
106 Cf Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 242. The idea is analogous to the relation-
ship between the prosecution's statutory and constitutional duties of disclosure in criminal 
cases. 
107 Judge Frankel has suggested eliminating even this limited form of privilege by requiring 
disclosure of all material evidence to one's adversary in civil cases. See Frankel, The Search 
for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. CoLO. L. REv. 51 (1982). Formal 
discovery rights could continue to be available in Frankel's proposed scheme as an adjunct to 
the disclosure duty, but it does not seem that even an opponent's extreme negligence in failing 
to exercise discovery rights would excuse one's duty to disclose. 
1991] MISSING EVIDENCE 861 
Future references to "suppression" should be understood as lim-
ited to illegitimate suppression, unless otherwise indicated. 
The Dilemma of Suppression 
The problem of responding to (illegitimate) suppression, even in 
the paradigm case, is related to the problem of what we should infer 
from the act of suppression. When I say "we" here, I mean the law 
generally, not any particular instrumentality like the jury. Neverthe-
less, the matter of what is to be inferred is discussed most fully in the 
literature related to the making of adverse inference arguments to the 
trier of fact. While there has long been judicial endorsement of the 
idea that an act of suppression indicates a consciousness of guilt or 
otherwise being (legally) in the wrong, the fact of suppression, even if 
conclusively established, does not prove that the suppressor should, 
suppression aside, lose the underlying litigation. 108 This follows from 
the fact that even persons in the legal right may be, and often are, 
insecure of winning; thus, suppression may be the act of someone in 
the right trying to insure that the law will not miscarry. 109 Much 
stronger than such a "consciousness of liability" inference is the nar-
rower inference that the suppressor (rightly) believed the evidence in 
question would be damaging to his case if presented to the tribunal. 110 
Such a belief could well be the basis of an inference against a party 
who fully believed himself to be in the rightY 1 But even this infer-
ence suffers from the possibility of contrary explanations, such as the 
possibility that the evidence in question, though not damaging to the 
suppressor's case, would be embarrassing or injurious to the suppres-
sor for other reasons, or the possibility that, in the case of evidence 
destruction, the act was without advertence to the evidentiary signifi-
cance of the information destroyed. 
Analytically, then, we may distinguish the litigant who should 
108 See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 277-78 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); McCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 50, § 273. 
109 The classic expression of this proposition is to be found in Justice Shaw's opinion in 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 317 (1850): "[A]n innocent man, when 
placed by circumstances in a condition of suspicion and danger, may resort to deception in the 
hope of avoiding the force of such proofs." 
110 See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 285; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 50, 
§ 272. 
III A further difference between the two forms of inference is that the consciousness of 
liability argument makes sense at trial, if at all, whether or not the evidence is ultimately 
presented to the tribunal or discovered by the opponent. The consciousness of adversity of 
evidence argument applies at trial, if at all, only if the evidence is not revealed, for if it is 
revealed, there is no need of an inference to its probative value by way of the suppressor's 
beliefs; the probative value can be weighed directly by the opponent and, if introduced, by the 
trier of fact. 
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prevail if all the material facts were known (the "theoretical winner") 
from the litigant who should lose under that condition (the "theoreti-
cal loser"), and ask what the law's response should be if suppression is 
committed by the former, or alternatively by the latter. One simple 
response is that no adverse consequences ought to be imposed upon a 
theoretical winner who suppresses evidence, since by hypothesis he 
ought to win the suit. There is something very unsatisfactory about 
this answer. There is a separate interest at stake, an interest in the 
proper process of adjudication. We cannot allow a party to interfere 
with the tribunal's capacity to make the necessary determination, 
even if that party believes (or knows) that it is the theoretical winner. 
By the same token, default on the merits does not seem an adequate 
response to suppression by the theoretical loser, for it would give in-
adequate incentive to forego suppression in cases where the unsup-
pressed state of the evidence is strongly against the person 
contemplating suppression, suppression can significantly alter the 
strength of the evidence, and there is a significant chance the suppres-
sion will go undetected. Again, it is necessary to recognize the sepa-
rate interest at stake. 
There will, however, be dispute about the precise reason for this 
conclusion. Some advocates of a "fairness" approach, not unlike the 
"fair contest" theory criticized earlier, argue that response is required 
because the correct result on the merits is whatever results from a fair 
process. 112 But if this fair process is conceived as independent of get-
ting at the truth of the material allegations, so that the notions of 
theoretical winner and loser described above are irrelevant to the poli-
cies of litigation, then it is hard to discern why the suppression of 
evidence should have any effect upon the fairness of the adjudication. 
The suggestion could be made that the unfairness of suppression 
arises from inequality of opportunity to suppress, since there is often 
an asymmetry in the initial access of parties to information. This 
would imply, however, that in cases where there is no such inequality, 
it does not matter whether suppression occurs. But it would matter to 
the trier of fact, and also to those third persons who look to the judg-
ment in the case as a statement about the disputed merits, just as it 
can matter when both parties reject evidence available to each. More-
over, as illustrated in our discussion of unfound evidence, there is no 
reason to worry about any particular form of inequality, as a matter 
112 See, e.g., Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at I 160-62. Adjudication is thereby conceived 
as a problem of what John Rawls calls "pure procedural justice." See J. RAWLS, A THEORY 
OFJUSTICE 85-86 (1971) (arguing, to the contrary, that trials are not properly conceived in this 
way). 
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oflitigation policy, unless it has untoward impacts upon the outcomes 
of litigation, and there is no plausible way to discuss, even in theory, 
whether this is so without recourse to accuracy of decision as a nor-
mative model. 113 It is precisely because the process is aimed at deter-
mining, as best as possible, who is the theoretical winner that 
suppression requires response. 114 This is almost, but not quite, to say 
that if we somehow knew, in a particular case, the truth of the mate-
rial allegations despite the suppression, then the suppression would be 
irrelevant to the law's procedural purposes. More precisely, it would 
become irrelevant only if we used a process for resolving disputes that 
would, in all cases of suppression, yield at least as accurate results, 
with no greater costs to opponent or third parties, as would be the 
case without suppression. 
If, then, the need for response is ultimately traceable to this un-
certainty as to who is the theoretical winner, the details of response 
are affected severely by a different source of uncertainty. Obviously, 
one of the most difficult aspects of solving a suppression problem is 
knowing when it happens. The putative suppressor may deny ever 
having access to the information in question, or even deny the infor-
mation ever existed, or assert facts which if true would make the sup-
pression legitimate. The resulting uncertainty has considerable 
importance to the framing of appropriate responses to instances of 
suspected suppression. In cases where it can be known with sufficient 
certainty that suppression has occurred, as where the suppressor has 
refused a discovery request on an invalid claim of privilege, the pri-
mary problem is in fashioning a remedy that responds to both the 
needs of the present case and to the more general concern about con-
trolling the conduct of litigations. In cases of merely suspected sup-
113 Solum & Marzen suggest that the sense of equality involved is not equality of opportu-
nity to destroy evidence, but rather the equality of opportunity to "discover, introduce, ques-
tion, and impeach" evidence. Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1162. But it is not explained 
why this is the more appropriate sense of equality, nor can it be explained without reference to 
accuracy of decision as the normative model. 
114 In an effort to support the "fair process" theory, Solum & Marzen articulate the differ-
ence between a "correspondence" theory of truth and a "discourse" theory of truth, the former 
being associated with the accuracy of decision model and the latter being associated with the 
fair process approach, but they rightly acknowledge that the discourse theory suffers from a 
category mistake in that it conflates the meaning of truth with the methods for arriving at 
truth. I d. at 1162-65. What appears to account for these authors' flirtation with the discourse 
theory, despite this acknowledgment, is either their lack of recognition of the viability of the 
narrower form of inference, by way of a consciousness of the damaging character of the evi-
dence, or their mistaken assumption that the narrower inference cannot be associated with a 
correspondence theory of truth. The weakness of the broader consciousness of liability infer-
ence is then wrongly viewed as embarrassing to the correspondence theory. There is, however, 
no congruence between this difference in theory of inference from suppression and the indi-
cated difference in theories of truth. 
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pression, this problem is compounded by uncertainty about the 
situation the law confronts, and the consequent risk of imposing sanc-
tions upon a party who has not in truth illegitimately concealed 
anything. 115 
The focus on a proper process of adjudication, and even the ex-
cesses to which such a focus can be taken, serve to remind us of an 
important limitation of the law's traditional focus on inferences that 
are to be drawn from suppression. Even in situations where no infer-
ence may rightly be drawn, there may be an injury that necessitates 
legal response. The most important example of this is the situation of 
negligent destruction of evidence. 116 Although no inference from any 
awareness by the destroyer is warranted, some form of remedy may be 
necessary. 117 
What evidence can be offered to show that there is a serious 
problem of suppression? It clearly presupposes an imperfect flow of 
information between opponents through the system of discovery, and 
there exists both analytical and empirical work suggesting such im-
perfections. 118 I will add nothing here to that literature, but I note the 
indirect evidence of the law's response. The variety of legal doctrines 
brought to bear on this problem, and the number of cases in which 
those doctrines are successfully invoked, suggest that the law is regis-
tering a serious problem. 119 This is not to say, necessarily, that such 
law constitutes the tip of an iceberg threatening to overwhelm the 
system or undermine its legitimacy. They may simply reflect a recur-
rent problem that demands attention, albeit more systematic attention 
115 See Shavell, Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Legal Tribunals, 
9 lNT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1989). 
116 Significantly, this problem generally does not happen in the case of withholding of evi-
dence; once the matter is brought to the attention of the suppressor, continued withholding 
will be advertent. Of course, until the failure to disclose is brought to the suppressor's atten-
tion, it is possible to speak of negligent withholding, but it may also be true that until brought 
to the suppressor's attention by an appropriate discovery request, the withholding is legitimate. 
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
117 Cf Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1165 ("On the fair process account, destruction of 
evidence subverts the search for truth, irrespective of the motive that prompts the destruc-
tion"). This may be the valid point that misleads these authors into considering seriously the 
discourse theory of truth. See supra note 114. 
118 See generally W. LASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968); 
Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 567 (1989); Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 787; Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery 
in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055 (1979). This conference has added a new 
contribution to this literature, see Nesson, supra note 2, and Nance, supra note 2. 
119 For an extensive compilation of statutes and cases, covering only the more limited con-
text of suppression by destruction of tangible evidence, see J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. 
SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989). 
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than it has been given up to now. On the other hand, neither is it to 
say that existing responses are adequate to the task of controlling evi-
dence suppression. 
Juridical Responses to Suppression 
The problem of responding to illegitimate suppression of evi-
dence by a party can arise in a wide variety of procedural contexts. 
Accordingly, the law's response has taken many different forms. I 
shall briefly assay the most common types of response. For purposes 
of exposition, they are numbered and discussed in order of what may 
loosely be considered the severity of the response. I make no claims 
crucially dependent upon the ordering, and in particular cases the ac-
tual severity of the response, at least as perceived by the parties, may 
be different. 
All the following responses are just that: responses, arising out of 
the belief, or at least suspicion, that evidence has been or is being 
suppressed. One might devote some attention to the problem of antic-
ipating the suppression of evidence. Occasionally, a party may take 
the initiative in obtaining judicial assistance to prevent her opponent 
from destroying evidence. 12° For the most part, however, the sup-
pression has already occurred, or is continuing in nature, before a 
party discovers or suspects it. I will, therefore, focus on the latter 
situations. By the same token, the discovery of suppression may not 
occur until after the trial of the cause. That will necessitate consider-
ation of the possibility of reopening the case for further proceed-
ings.121 I am not here concerned with the principles or doctrines of 
finality covering the decision whether or not to reopen the case, but 
rather with the question that must be answered thereafter. If the case 
is reopened, the question remains what to do with the suppression, 
whether simply to retry the case with the missing evidence now 
presented, if available, or to take some further action against the sup-
pressor along the lines described below. Likewise, if the case is not to 
be reopened, it must be decided whether to take any of the actions 
described below that are available under such circumstances. 
1. Informal Judicial Persuasion and Condemnation. Informal 
pressure is often effective, as settlement practices illustrate. Judicial 
persuasion, in the form of invitations, exhortations, or threats, can be 
employed to induce the suppressor to present the evidence in question 
or make it available to the opponent. Threat, in this context, means 
12o Id. at 76. 
121 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(b) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. The matter is discussed 
briefly in Nesson, supra note 2, at 798, and Nance, supra note 2, at 813. 
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no more than the indication that harsher responses are in the offing. 
Depending on the threatened sanction, this response can be more se-
vere than its place in the list would suggest. Even if the evidence is no 
longer available to the suppressor, judicial condemnation of the con-
duct of the suppressor, possibly in front of the jury if there is one, is 
itself a sanction that can be employed. 122 
2. Drawing an Adverse Inference. The suppressor's opponent 
may be allowed to present evidence of the suppression and to invite 
the trier of fact to infer something therefrom, usually that the sup-
pressed evidence would, if presented, be favorable to the opponent. 123 
The argument can be supported by a formal instruction informing the 
jury, if there is one, that such an inference is allowed; indeed, this may 
be necessary to avoid the possible assumption by jurors that un-
presented evidence cannot be considered in any way. 124 The court 
can add weight to an adverse inference by creating a presumption, 
that is, by instructing the trier of fact to accept the invitation to draw 
an inference adverse to the suppressor unless the suppressor offers a 
satisfactory explanation of his actions consistent with his position at 
trial. 12s 
3. Exclusion of Suppressor's Evidence. The trial court may ex-
122 Cf Williams v. United States, 381 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1967), where the court sustained 
the admission of heroin against a claim of inadequate chain of custody, but chastised the of-
ficers charged with custody for being inexcusably lax in preserving the evidential integrity of 
the substance. 
123 The ambiguities of inference involved here have already been discussed briefly. See 
· supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. These ambiguities of inference do not, of course, 
mean that an act of suppression is irrelevant to the underlying merits. In any given case, the 
possibility of exculpatory explanations may be probabilistically outweighed by the inculpatory 
explanations. Evidence of suppression is quite generally considered relevant and admitted, 
notwithstanding the obvious prejudicial potential. See J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, 
supra note 119, §§ 2.4, 2.24; Oesterle, supra note 101, at 1232-39. 
124 Compare the following two standard jury instructions: 
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably 
available to him and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may 
infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and 
did not. 
3 E. DEVITI & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 92, § 72.16, and 
The law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who have been 
present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have 
knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial. Nor does the law require any party 
to produce as exhibits all papers and things mentioned in the evidence in the case. 
Id., § 73.11. 
125 See J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, § 2.1; cf 9 J. WIGMORE, 
supra note 67, § 2524 ("[T]hat a rule of presumption can be predicted is doubtful."). While 
this strategy may seem possible only in the context of jury trials, where formal instructions are 
given to the jury, in principle it can be used in bench trials as well by the trial court simply 
informing the suppressor of its intention to accept the opponent's invitation to draw an adverse 
inference, absent satisfactory explanation by the suppressor of his acts of suppression. 
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elude evidence offered by the suppressor conditioned upon his 
presenting the suppressed evidence. 126 If one is looking simply for 
leverage, there is no necessity that the excluded evidence bear any 
particular relation to the suppressed evidence. In fact, however, ex-
cluded evidence is generally connected to the suppressed evidence in 
such a way that the probative value of the former may be significantly 
atfecied by the latter. 127 
4. Making an Adverse Sufficiency Ruling. A ruling can be made 
against a suppressor who bears the burden of production on an issue 
to which the suppressed evidence would likely relate. 128 This is more 
severe than an adverse inference in that it can remove a case from the 
deliberation of the trier of fact. As discussed in connection with un-
found and rejected evidence, the ruling can be either a consequence 
of, or an adjunct to, the usual standard of proof applied to the kind of 
case involved. 
5. Conclusive Presumption or Issue Preclusion. A presumption 
adverse to the suppressor can be made conclusive, leaving the sup-
pressor no way to contend with his opponent over the issue thereby 
precluded. 129 This has the effect of rendering any other evidence of-
fered by the suppressor on that issue irrelevant, unless of course it is 
relevant to some other issue in the case left open by the judicial sanc-
tion. The preclusion can be narrow, covering only the specific matter 
to which the missing evidence might most likely relate, or it can be 
broad, covering the entire claim or defense to which the evidence 
would relate, or even covering the entire lawsuit by dismissal or de-
fault judgment. 130 
126 This, once again, is a principal function of many classic exclusionary rules. See supra 
note 16 and accompanying text. Explicit authority, more general in scope but more limited by 
procedural context, is now granted by discovery sanction rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(B). 
127 See, e.g., State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Iowa 1979) ("A spoliator of evidence 
cannot be deprived of his legal rights by the exclusion of other and totally independant evi-
dence offered by him."). An exception may be exclusions under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B), 
whereby all the suppressor's potential evidence on a particular issue may be precluded, regard-
less of the relationship between the suppressed evidence and the excluded evidence. See, e.g., 
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (lOth Cir. 1978). 
128 The underexamined use of sufficiency rules and rulings has already been noted in con-
nection with unfound and rejected evidence. See supra notes 47-60, 74-90 and accompanying 
text. There is, of course, even greater justification for employing such responses when the 
missing evidence is actually suppressed. 
129 See, e.g., FED. R. Clv. P. 37(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., Berger, The "No-Source" Presumption: 
The Harshest Remedy, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 603 (1987) (criticizing the use of conclusive pre-
sumptions against news reporters who refuse to reveal confidential sources in libel actions). 
130 See, e.g., FED. R. CJV. P. 37(b)(2)(C). See generally J. GoRELICK, S. MARZEN & L. 
SOLUM, supra note I 19, § 3.16 at 120-26 (destruction of tangible evidence); Berger, supra note 
129, at 625-27 (withholding of evidence). 
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6. Sanctions for Contempt of Court. A trial judge may impose 
sanctions for contempt of court, to some extent as an incident of the 
principal proceeding. In "civil" contempt, fines are payable to the 
opponent as compensation, and temporary confinement can be em-
ployed to coerce a party into revealing suppressed information. 131 
Fines, payable to the state, and imprisonment for "criminal" con-
tempt are possible as well. 132 These sanctions presuppose, of course, 
that the suppressor's acts come within the jurisdiction of the court's 
contempt power. 133 
7. Separate Civil Action for Damages. A separate civil action can 
be aiiowed the suppressor's opponent, awarding monetary compensa-
tion for the injury done to her in not having her case decided on the 
best reasonably available evidence, or in suffering the risk thereof. 134 
This response is relatively serious in view of the substantial additional 
resources that must be committed to a separate legal proceeding and 
the substantial civil liability that may be imposed pursuant to such a 
proceeding. 
8. Separate Criminal Proceeding. Fines and imprisonment can 
also result from an entirely separate proceeding instituted by the gov-
ernment under criminal prohibitions relating to the obstruction of 
justice. 135 
This list is not, of course, exhaustive. One occasionally en-
counters hybrids or responses of limited applicability, as for example 
the staying of proceedings until evidence is produced by a party. 136 
This response, which obviously can be employed effectively only 
against plaintiffs, is both a direct sanction in that plaintiff's recovery, 
if any, is delayed, and it is a threat of future sanction in that plaintiff 
may eventually be subject to a bar of the suit for want of diligent 
prosecution. 137 Of even narrower applicability, the actions of the sup-
pressor may constitute a waiver of the right to object to certain other 
131 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D) and 37(b) (last paragraph). A contempt proceed-
ing is civil in character if its purpose is to coerce compliance with a court order or to provide 
compensation to a party for losses resulting from violation of such an order. United States v. 
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1946). 
132 See J. GoRELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, § 5.12 (destruction of evi-
dence); Oesterle, supra note 101, at 1204-07 (same). For an important example in the context 
of evidence withholding, see Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
910 (1958) (imprisonment for failure to reveal news source). 
133 J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, at 197 (limitation of contempt 
to "in-court" defiance of judicial authority). 
I 34 See generally id. §§ 4.1-.23 (spoliation tort). 
135 See id. §§ 5.2-.10 and Oesterle, supra note 101, at 1191-1204 (federal and state obstruc-
tion of justice statutes). 
136 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
137 See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962). 
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evidence presented by the opponent, particularly if there is an eviden-
tiary rule, such as the original document rule, the hearsay rule, or the 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses, that 
would otherwise require the opponent to present the suppressed evi-
dence instead of the proffered evidence. 138 While this "waiver" must 
be recognized as, in truth, a form of sanction, 139 it is obviously avail-
able in only a small percentage of suppression cases. Moreover, the 
significance of the suppression is simply in excusing the opponent's 
failure to comply with the otherwise applicable exclusionary rule, and 
only in unusual cases will that be a function of the way that the sup-
pressed evidence comes to be unavailable, provided of course the op-
ponent does not participate in making it unavailable. 140 
In some situations it is possible for the attorney representing the 
suppressing party to be disciplined for his or her role in abetting, en-
couraging, or instigating the suppression. 141 As an adjunct to the 
sanctions imposed upon parties, this is entirely reasonable in prescrib-
ing an appropriate sharing of responsibility for suppression between 
lawyer and client. But insofar as the professional duties are independ-
ent of the duties placed upon litigants, so that sanctions are imposed 
upon the lawyer when none would be imposed upon the client, it 
presents the problem of seriously pitting the lawyer against the client, 
or more precisely, pitting the lawyer's responsibility against the law-
yer's strong interest in a satisfied client. 142 Given the economics of 
practice, this tension cannot help but be resolved, in the vast majority 
138 See, e.g., United States v. Mastrengelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982) (addressing defend-
ant's involvement in murder of witness and consequent admissibility of witness's grand jury 
testimony as against hearsay and confrontation objections); State v. Gettings, 244 Kan. 236, 
769 P.2d 25 (1989) (same). 
139 Since the intent of the suppressor is invariably not to relinquish his right to object, the 
waiver must be considered constructive or fictional only. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1977) (discussing various forms of fictional 
waivers of objection to admissibility of evidence). See generally L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 
(1967). 
140 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 804(a) (conditions under which a declarant is considered un-
available for purposes of hearsay exceptions conditioned upon unavailability); FED. R. Evm. 
I 004 (excuses for not presenting the original of a document otherwise within the prohibition of 
the original document rule). Interestingly enough, the sanction consists in the excusing of 
exclusionary rules in such a manner as to place them in greater apparent harmony with the 
principle that a party need only produce the best evidence that is reasonably available. 
141 See J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, §§ 7.1-.13 (professional 
responsibility). 
142 In presenting his proposal for a general duty of disclosure in civil cases, see supra note 
103, Judge Frankel was somewhat unclear about whether this would be a duty of the client or 
of the attorney, a point emphasized by his friendly critic. See Alschuler, The Search for Truth 
Continued, the Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. CoLo. L. REV. 67 
(1982). 
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of cases, in favor of suppression. 143 One can doubt the extent to 
which these provisions are effective for any purpose, including profes-
sional public relations. Accordingly, it has been argued that the prob-
lem of suppression of truth by counsel is best handled "primarily 
through re-examination and alteration of evidentiary and procedural 
law, not through ethical proscriptions that would preclude counsel 
from asserting rights that are available to his client under law." 144 
Putting aside these nuances, each of the principal responses listed 
above, except number seven, is instantiated in some measure in most 
jurisdictions. Each, however, is subject to important qualifications 
that restrict its availability as a response to suppression. It has been 
observed recently and correctly that the law has employed these re-
sponses in a rather ad hoc fashion, without serious reflection on the 
alternatives and their supporting rationales. 145 Here I will add a brief 
summary of the prevailing pattern of employment of the indicated 
responses. 
Consider civil cases first. Since the eighteenth century, the pri-
mary lines of defense against evidence suppression, beyond informal 
judicial persuasion, have been what may be called the evidentiary re-
sponses: conditional exclusion of related evidence presented by the 
suppressor; allowance of an adverse inference argument, with or with-
out supporting jury instructions at the deliberative phase of the case; 
or, a sufficiency ruling adverse to the suppressor. 146 Since the advent 
of modern liberal discovery, the exclusionary response has been ex-
panded and both issue preclusion and contempt citations have been 
added as sanctions for refusal to disclose information to an opponent, 
but for the most part such sanctions have been thought to be predi-
cated on a specific court order requiring the disclosure, a requirement 
that seriously hampers their employment in cases where evidence is 
destroyed prior to the entry of such an order. 147 Under the idea of 
civil contempt, the trial court can support the opponent's efforts by 
ordering the payment of money to the suppressor's opponent for ex-
penses incurred in efforts to obtain access to the suppressed evidence. 
By causing the suppressor to internalize his opponent's discovery 
143 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 118, at 570-74. 
144 Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921,925. 
145 Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1191. 
146 Of course, in this century most academic attention has focused on the adverse inference. 
See Maguire & Vincent, supra note 8; Oesterle, supra note 101; Solum & Marzen, supra note 8; 
J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, §§ 1.2-1.5. 
147 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). See generally, J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. So-
LUM, supra note 119, §§ 3.3-.4 (examining limitation in context of destruction of tangible evi-
dence). For a proposal to modify the federal rules to deal with the problem by imposing an 
affirmative obligation to preserve evidence, see Oesterle;, supra note 101, at 1239-45. 
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costs, the suppressor could be induced to produce evidence, or assist 
in its production, when that evidence is more easily produced by him 
or with his assistance. Shifting of investigation costs, as currently 
practiced, usually covers only the opponent's expenses of compelling, 
or attempting to compel, discovery, but a few decisions require the 
payment of expenses of independent investigation to obtain otherwise 
suppressed information. 148 Finally, in recent years a minority of juris-
dictions have recognized a new action in tort for the "spoliation" of 
evidence, allowing the kind of monetary recovery described in re-
sponse number seven. So far, the tort has been recognized only for 
the destruction of evidence; no case has explicitly recognized such a 
tort for wrongful withholding of evidence. 149 
Turning to criminal cases, the origins are much the same. Tradi-
tionally, the major supplements to judicial suasion have been the evi-
dentiary responses. In the case of suppression by the defense, the use 
of adverse sufficiency rulings has, of course, been limited by the un-
availability of preemptory judgments against the accused, 150 and the 
use of adverse inferences has been to some extent limited in recent 
decades by the privilege against self-incrimination. 151 To this picture 
has been added possible prosecution for obstruction of justice, made 
criminal by statutes in all states and under federal law, a response that 
has been directed at persons prosecuted, or intended to be prosecuted, 
for separate offenses. 152 With regard to governmental suppression, 
statutory and constitutional standards requiring the disclosure of ex-
culpatory evidence have developed in recent decades, with sanctions 
ranging from adverse inferences, to exclusion of related evidence, to 
148 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago Illinois on May 15, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 
613,621-22 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (airline liable for additional expenses incurred by plaintiff in order 
to prove liability as a consequence of airline's destruction of internal report). Cf. McFarland v. 
Gregory, 425 F.2d 443, 449-50 (2d. Cir. 1970) (award of increased costs for opponent's expert 
caused by party's inadequate response to document discovery). See also, J. GORELICK, S. 
MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, § 3.16, at 119. 
149 See supra note 134. Of course, if the withholding is known to (and demonstrable by) the 
opponent in time, discovery can be compelled by civil contempt, confinement or the threat of 
criminal contempt or other responsive measures can be taken in the principal case. See supra 
notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
150 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 51,§ 1.8(g). 
151 This limits responses only to the extent that the suppressed evidence is the defendant's 
testimony or evidence sufficiently analogous thereto to be considered within the scope of the 
privilege. See Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. 
California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1980). Similar limitations should be 
acknowledged with regard to the conditional exclusion of defense evidence. See Nance, Condi-
tional Relevance, supra note 16, at 482-83. 
152 Practically speaking, this response is not available with respect to suppression by civil 
litigants, unless the government is the adversely affected party. See Oesterle, supra note 101, at 
1201-04 (discussing incentives for private litigants and prosecutorial authorities). 
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dismissal of the prosecution. 153 
The most obvious issue that arises from this historical pattern is 
whether the modern responses, including sanctions that attend refus-
als of discovery and the new spoliation tort, have preempted the role 
of the more traditional evidentiary devices for controlling suppres-
sion. The latter are invoked at trial whereas the former are generally 
invoked pretrial or posttrial. For example, does it make sense to im-
pose both a contempt citation for refusal of discovery and an adverse 
inference at trial? Or, both an adverse inference and an award of 
damages in a separate tort action? Somewhat more subtle is the ques-
tion of whether the conditions that are currently imposed upon the 
availability of various responses make sense when viewed as part of 
the larger problem of developing a pattern of response to suppression. 
The following section will try to shed some light on these issues. 
Matching Responses to Goals 
There are four immediate goals of responding to the suppression 
of evidence: (1) to recognize any probative significance attributable to 
the suppression itself, considered as an additional evidentiary datum; 
(2) to reverse the suppression and thereby make the evidence in ques-
tion available to the tribunal; (3) to compensate the victims of sup-
pression for the injury to their distinct interest in a proper 
adjudication of the dispute; and (4) to deter the suppressor and other 
potential suppressors from similar conduct in the future. 154 As will be 
elaborated below, the second and third goals are different forms of 
compensatory justice, while the fourth invokes a broader notion of 
corrective justice. 155 Each is a part of an overall system of protecting 
the rights of litigants to an appropriate adjudication of the dispute. 
As already argued, suppression is a harm to both the interests of 
the opponent and the interests of the tribunal itself. 156 The injury to 
!53 See, e.g., Thorne v. Dep't of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331-32 (Alaska 1989) (ad-
verse inference); People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 54-55 (Colo. 1989) (dismissal); People v. 
Moore, 34 Cal. 3d 2!5, 666 P.2d 419, 193 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1983) (exclusion of derivative evi-
dence). Earlier cases are collected in Comment, The Prosecution's Duty to Preserve Evidence 
Before Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1035-38 (1984). 
!54 These goals are related, but not entirely congruent, to the "functions" of "accuracy, 
compensation, and punishment" articulated in Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1166-68. 
The main reason for the difference is that these authors address only the issue of destruction of 
evidence, where reversal of suppression is ruled out by hypothesis. 
155 See, e.g., Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (1976). The 
classic discussion of corrective justice is, of course, ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, 
113la, 113lb, 1132b. See generally NOMOS XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE (J. Chapman 
ed. 1991). 
!56 The point is well made by Judge Thompson in an unusual opinion finding a duty not to 
destroy evidence in civil cases, a duty arising from the due process clause: "All parties are free 
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the opponent is obvious enough, but it is crucial to recognize that 
there is a separate harm to the tribunal, for this point is easily ne-
glected. Whether a civil or criminal case, the convening of a court for 
the sake of resolving the dispute places a burden of responsibility 
upon judges and juries as well as burdens of expense upon the public 
and upon the jurors and their families. The suppression of evidence 
constitutes an affront to these persons in their official roles. Con-
versely, reversal of suppression eliminates much of the harm done to 
the suppressor's opponent and to the tribunal. It removes the princi-
pal injury in that it makes it possible to decide the issue with the more 
complete set of evidence that, but for the suppression, would have 
been available to the tribunal. Just as specific restitution is often a 
superior method of correcting a substantive wrong than the award of 
damages, with its inevitable vagaries of estimating loss, so reversal of 
suppression is the preferred procedural remedy here, provided of 
course that it can be accomplished. Nevertheless, reversal leaves the 
affront to dignity and the loss of time and energy necessary to effectu-
ate the reversal. 157 
Compensation is often a broader concept, but I use it to denote 
making the injured person in some sense whole, by a method other 
than reversal of the suppression, and not including any psychic com-
pensation that a victim derives merely from the punishment of the 
suppressor. 158 Compensation has two distinct components. One is 
the ancillary compensation needed as an incident to successful rever-
sal of suppression. As just noted, reversal does not quite fully com-
pensate either the opponent or the tribunal. Given reversal, we may 
be prepared to accept the marginal uncompensated loss to the tribu-
nal, but the opponent should certainly receive compensation for any 
expenses incurred in effectuating disclosure of the information in 
question, and possibly for the anxiety produced by enduring the risk 
of successful suppression. The second component arises in those situ-
ations where reversal cannot be effectuated, where the suppressed evi-
dence never comes to light or does so too late to be of use in resolving 
the principal litigation. Here the harm to opponent and tribunal is 
serious and the achievement of compensation extremely difficult, es-
to invoke the protection of this and other courts to protect their rights. However, this privilege 
carries a concomitant responsibility of fairness, both to the Court and the adverse party, in 
prosecuting one's suit." Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547 (W.D. Okla. 1979). 
157 Reversal also affects the nature of the probative value of the suppression itself, as it 
renders superfluous any indirect inference as to what the unpresented evidence would have 
shown. See supra note I I I and accompanying text. 
158 I use the term "compensatory" or "corrective" to indicate the broader notions. See 
supra note !55 and accompanying text. Cf. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 8, at 227. 
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pecially if the information is never brought forth. Efforts may be 
taken both to approximate at trial the forgone probative value of the 
missing evidence and to compensate for ancillary losses suffered by 
the opponent. 
Compensatory responses suffer from a well-known defect of such 
schemes generally. Even if the negative value of the compensatory 
response to the suppressor equals or exceeds the gains that the sup-
pressor hoped to obtain by his acts, the discounting of the negative 
value by the probability of being discovered in the suppression may 
often leave the expected gains from suppression greater than the ex-
pected losses. 159 Thus there arises the need, in those cases where sup-
pression is calculated, even in a rough intuitive fashion, to impose 
additional sanctions that will more effectively deter acts of suppres-
sion. The problem here, as elsewhere in the law, is determining the 
optimal level and form of additional sanctions. 160 Much as the notion 
of compensation used above is expressed as an adjunct of, or regretta-
ble alternative to, the reversal of suppression, so the deterrence goal is 
here articulated as an adjunct of, and regrettable alternative to, the 
reversal of suppression or compensation for the harms thereof. That 
is, deterrence ought to enter the response only after the best compen-
satory response has been formulated, and it ought to take into ac-
count the deterrent effects of the formulated compensatory response. 
This tertiary priority of deterrence reflects the indefiniteness of predic-
tions of future acts and the punitive character of deterrence beyond 
that inherent in compensatory responses. If deterrence presupposes 
159 See generally Nesson, supra note 2 (illustrating the calculations of "bad man" civil liti-
gants who discount for the probability of escaping effective sanctions). In the criminal context, 
the clearest example is the practice in dealing with unconstitutional governmental suppression 
discovered after conviction: If the evidence is still available, the remedy is merely reversal for 
possible retrial, even if the suppression is calculated. See, e.g., Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 
65 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1013 (1980). Cf supra note 153 (evidence destruction 
cases). Only limited deterrence can be found in the expense and inconvenience of a second 
prosecution. This limitation may be peculiar to the constitutional source of the sanction: In 
due process review, according to the Supreme Court, the focus is on assuring defendant a fair 
trial, not punishing the prosecution. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). Cf 
United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983) (deterrence of misconduct appropriate under 
courts' supervisory power). 
160 Without an extended excursus into the theory of punishment, one point should be noted. 
Of course, one cannot deter an act of suppression that has already occurred, and it would 
violate the suppressor's moral rights if he were treated merely as the means of deterring, by the 
example set, future acts of suppression. Thus, the punitive sanction, if it is to be justifiable, 
must be seen as the imposition of a sanction previously promised to those who suppress evi-
dence, and that requires it to be imposed pursuant to a regime of sanctions announced prior to 
the acts being punished. See, e.g., Byrd, Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, 
Retribution in its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151 (1989). 
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calculated deception or other mendacity, then the imposition of deter-
rent sanctions imputes such mental states, something we should, out 
of simple civility, hesitate to do. 161 I will refer to such supplemental 
sanctions, added for the sake of deterrence, as punitive. 162 Like com-
pensatory and punitive sanctions in substantive law, it is important to 
integrate the response in order to accomplish compensatory and de-
terrent goals in a complementary fashion. 163 
If we look now at the inventory of responses, we can make some 
useful observations concerning their rationales. Informal judicial per-
suasion, including the threat of more severe sanctions, is principally 
intended to reverse a decision to suppress, though it can be used to 
punish the insistent suppressor and thereby deter future acts of the 
sort. 164 On the other hand, citation for criminal contempt and crimi-
nal prosecution for obstruction of justice are clearly punitive. Fines 
payable to the opponent under civil contempt, as well as damages 
payable to the opponent under the separate action in tort, where al-
lowed, are obviously designed to provide compensation, though liber-
ally computed fines and the availability of punitive damages in tort 
can help perfect the deterrent element of these sanctions. 165 That 
leaves what I have called the evidentiary responses. There is greater 
ambiguity in, and dispute about, the nature of these sanctions. 
As noted earlier, there was a time when discovery was not so 
widely available, and the evidentiary responses were the primary lines 
of defense against suppression. The response most widely associated 
with this function is the allowance of an adverse inference argument 
or instruction. 166 Both the threat of its use and its actual use consti-
tute an incentive for the suppressor to bring forth the information in 
question, first in order to avoid the argument that the missing evi-
161 This reluctance is reflected in judicial attitudes. See, e.g., Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 
770, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally Nesson, supra note 2 (lamenting judicial 
reluctance). 
162 As already suggested, my view is that retributivist notions serve as deontological con-
straints upon the general goal of deterrence in the use of punitive sanctions. See supra note 
160 and J. MURPHY & 1. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JURISPRUDENCE 109-24 (rev. ed. 1990). 
163 Occasions may arise where a punitive response must be formulated before the situation 
is ripe for determination of a compensatory response, but this is less likely to happen in the 
present context than in the substantive law. Cf. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156, 
158-59 (Me. 1983) (punitive damages in tort should be awarded with due recognition of previ-
ously imposed criminal punishment). 
164 If made in front of a jury, it could suggest compensatory inferences or even punitive 
action by the jury. The ambiguity of the message from the jury's point of view is reason 
enough to avoid such a practice. 
165 See Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at I 100 n.67, 1183. 
166 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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dence is adverse and later, after the inference is raised by the oppo-
nent, to counteract the inference. Ultimately, in the event the 
incentive is ineffective, the allowance of the argument and any associ-
ated jury instructions serve as a utilization of new evidence created by 
the act of suppression itself, and as a form of compensation for the 
opponent, giving her the benefit of the argument and instruction, if 
any, in place of what the suppressed evidence would have shown. The 
response is compensatory precisely to the extent the inference is in-
tended to approximate, in the trier's evaluation of the evidence, the 
probative value of the suppressed evidence or to provide ancillary 
compensation for the inconvenience of dealing with the suppression. 
At some point, however, there is a subtle slide into punitive re-
sponse. To the extent the doctrine is intended to go beyond what may 
be logically inferred from the suppression as to the merits of the claim 
or defense, the use of inferences and instructions generally becomes 
punitive. 167 This is suggested by decisions, going back to the earliest 
uses of the idea, that require the trier of fact to assume the worst 
about what the evidence would show against the suppressor. 168 Am-
biguity remains because there is the possibility that the suprarational 
inference is intended to compensate the opponent for the incidental 
losses that would not be fully compensated even if the suppression 
were reversed. The shift to punitive response seems palpable when 
the presumption is made irrebuttable, as when the issue is preemp-
tively decided in favor of the opponent. 169 The punitive character be-
comes fully manifest when such issue preclusion extends beyond the 
factual matter to which the suppressed evidence might plausibly relate 
to preclusion of the suppressor's entire claim or defense or, in the case 
of multipie causes, to default or dismissal for the entire case. 170 
167 This is the central theme of the classic study by Maguire & Vincent, supra note 8. They 
are critical of punitive measures, but only insofar as they are disruptive to an accurate resolu-
tion of the principal case. They do not consider explicitly the long run of cases as to which a 
deterrent sanction may be effective in improving accuracy. Moreover, their discussion of puni-
tiveness suggests hostility to retributive impulses, not to the deterrence of wrongdoing. !d. 
168 See, e.g., Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). It is, of course, possible 
that under the particular circumstances of suppression, the logical inference is that the evi-
dence is most conceivably damning to the suppressor. 
169 See. e.g., Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882). 
t7o This is most likely to be encountered in connection with a statutory discovery sanction. 
See supra note 127. There has been controversy over the constitutionality of using evidentiary 
sanctions for what I have called punitive goals, indeed over the constitutionality of the use of 
evidentiary sanctions as compensation. See, e.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 
U.S. 322 (1909). But the modern view is that no serious constitutional barrier is encountered, 
at least not in cases of deliberate suppression. Solum & Marzen, supra note 8, at 1177-82 (also 
arguing that compensation should be constitutional in negligent destruction cases). Neverthe-
less, the warning provided by these constitutional doubts reinforces the propriety of seeing 
punitive responses as disfavored. 
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Much the same can be said with regard to the exclusion of the 
suppressor's proffers and the use of adverse rulings on the sufficiency 
of the evidence. Conditional exclusion operates, in the first instance, 
as pressure to reverse the decision, whether knowingly or inadver-
tently made, to suppress other evidence. In the event that the sup-
pressor does not present the missing evidence, exclusion foUows from 
the pressure exerted and operates as a form of compensation to the 
opponent. Insofar as the exclusion covers evidence the probative 
value of which is substantially affected by the content of the sup-
pressed evidence, exclusion remains essentially compensatory in na-
ture. However, as the evidential connection between suppressed 
evidence and proffered evidence grows weaker, the punitive character 
of exclusion becomes dominant. 171 We have already noted, in connec-
iion with unfound and rejected evidence, how rulings on sufficiency 
can reflect either the failure of the burdened party to present evidence 
that can satisfy the persuasion requirement or a penalty for failure to 
remove unnecessary doubt in the result. 172 
An important question that emerges from this account is 
whether evidentiary responses should be employed in ways not aimed 
at facilitating accuracy in the particular case. Should the law take 
steps that risk undermining accuracy in a particular case in order to 
pursue the other goals of juridical response? This question poses 
greatest difficulties for what we have called the punitive dimension of 
these responses, where we increase the risk that a theoretical winner 
will be declared the loser simply in order to deter similarly situated 
parties from improper litigation practices. But a similar question can 
obviously be raised concerning the use of evidentiary responses for 
compensation ancillary to reversal of suppression or any other form of 
evidentiary compensation not aimed at restoring the probable accu-
racy of the result. 173 
As a first-order answer to these questions, such uses of eviden-
tiary sanctions should be avoided to the extent that appropriate sub-
stitutes are available. There is no reason to sacrifice accuracy if that is 
not necessary to effectuate compensatory and deterrent goals. Thus, 
171 This rarely if ever occurs under the conventional exclusionary rules, but it can be en-
countered in connection with discovery sanctions. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 52-58, 74-90 and accompanying text. 
173 I suspect that sensitivity to this issue accounts for some of the commentary critical of the 
use of adverse inferences, as the cases criticized often involve the weaker "consciousness of 
liability" inference that can be invoked even where the suppression is unsuccessful and the 
evidence in question is ultimately presented to the trier of fact. See, e.g., 22 C. WRIGHT & K. 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5178 (1978); MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 50, § 273. 
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monetary sanctions may be better responses to suppression in many 
cases, which in turn argues in favor of the extension of such forms of 
response, by endorsing both compensatory and deterrent monetary 
discovery sanctions and, where these are nonetheless inapplicable or 
inadequate, the spoliation tort. Moreover, there is no reason in prin-
ciple that the latter should not be extended to improper withholding 
of evidence, either from the opponent in discovery or, possibly, from 
the tribunal at trial. 174 The problem of sacrificing accuracy can also 
be avoided, at least to some extent, if the suppression is serious 
enough to warrant a summary dismissal or default judgment, for this 
can be clearly articulated as a response to the suppression and not a 
determination on the underlying merits, and the trier of fact is not 
required to struggle with a determination on the basis of artificially 
skewed evidence or standards for its evaluation. 175 
But much lies in the second order, in the careful consideration of 
alternatives in context, and it must be borne in mind that evidentiary 
sanctions have certain advantages over their monetary counterparts. 
The most important is that they generally do not require an explicit 
finding that evidence has been suppressed, with all the opprobrium 
that entails. There may, for example, be genuine controversy over 
whether it is merely unfound or whether it was legitimately destroyed, 
and evidentiary sanctions allow the court to put pressure on a party 
while preserving recognition of the possibility of innocent, or rela-
tively innocent, explanations for the absence of the evidence. 176 More 
subtly, because of their traditional association with judicial control 
over the courtroom, evidentiary sanctions may be (correctly or incor-
rectly) perceived as posing less a threat to the valued passivity of the 
judiciary. Finally, since evidence of the suppression will generally be 
admissible, it may often be difficult in practice to separate the evalua-
tion of the probative significance of that evidence from the determina-
174 As already noted, if the withholding is known to the opponent in time, discovery can 
usually be compelled by civil contempt confinement. See supra note 149 and accompanying 
text. This has the obvious merit of avoiding the waste of resources involved in generating an 
entirely separate litigation. But in civil cases where these measures are ineffective, and those 
where the suppressed evidence is discovered too late to be used by the opponent in the princi-
pal case, something like the spoliation tort is needed. 
175 This is not so easy to do in the context of issue preclusion that does not resolve an entire 
cause of action or defense. A trier of fact can be given a surreal exercise if, for example, it is 
told to assume negligence, when the evidence indicates to the contrary, and then to determine 
what damages proximately resulted from the counter-factually assumed negligence. 
176 A conspicuous exception is the exclusion of a party's evidence explicitly as a sanction for 
violation of a discovery order. See supra note 126. This form of response consequently has 
relatively little to commend it. 
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tion of ancillary compensatory or punitive responses by the trier of 
fact. 
If, for whatever reasons, it is necessary or desirable to make re-
course to evidentiary sanctions, there are advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with each form. When used in jury trials, the classic 
adverse inference relieves the trial judge of the responsibility of decid-
ing what to make of the claim of suppression, but only by placing the 
burden on participants more poorly suited to bear it. Questions about 
litigation tactics and the plausibility of excuses for nonpresentation of 
evidence are probably better handled by the trial judge, whose experi-
ence and training provides an expertise relative to such questions that 
is not shared by the jury. Moreover, judgment about the deterrent 
measures necessary to deal with the long run of similar cases involves 
a law-making skill and perspective that is better exercised by the judi-
ciary.177 Preferential exclusionary rulings avoid this problem at the 
cost of occasionally excluding relevant evidence and thereby present-
ing the trier of fact with an artificially distorted evidentiary package. 
Sufficiency rulings avoid this difficulty but generally come too late in 
the proceedings to allow the suppressor opportunity to produce with-
held evidence. 178 
A good case can be made for the elimination of the use of eviden-
tiary sanctions against a criminal defendant for punitive or even ancil-
lary compensatory purposes. In particular, unnecessary increases in 
the risk of erroneous conviction ought not be easily countenanced 
merely for the sake of long-run deterrence. 179 One manifestation of 
this is the invocation of the due process and compulsory process 
clauses to override ordinary exclusionary rules that, in the long-run 
interest of the production of evidence, would otherwise operate 
against the criminal defendant. 180 The message that may be drawn 
from this body of law is that in the case of evidence offered by a crimi-
177 These points are to be distinguished, of course, from any claim that judges are better fact 
finders on the substantive merits of the case. See Nance, Best Evidence, supra note 16, at 291. 
17 8 Even in cases of evidence destruction, where the suppression is rendered irreversible, an 
adverse sufficiency ruling is unlikely to contribute to. adequate general deterrence unless its 
punitive character is made clear by the trial judge's ruling, as will be the case in summary 
dismissals or defaults. 
179 It bears repeating that this would not mean that evidence of suppression by the defense 
would necessarily be inadmissible, as it could still be used to show the probable content of 
suppressed evidence or to suggest the indefinite inference as to the weakness of the defendant's 
case. See supra notes 108-11, 123 and accompanying text. Limiting instructions may be re-
quired. Cf Oesterle, supra note 101, at 1238 (claiming that adverse inference instructions 
originated as attempts to limit the use of evidence of suppression). 
lBO See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-98 (1973) (overriding state's re-
strictive hearsay rule); see generally E. IMWINKELRIED, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE (1990) 
(surveying criminal cases). 
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nal defendant, our evidentiary requirements must be applied on a 
case-by-case basis. In other words, prophylaxis must be pursued by 
means other than the threat of erroneous conviction. 181 The obvious 
candidates are contempt proceedings and separate prosecutions for 
obstruction of justice. 
Conversely, good reasons explain the dominance of evidentiary 
sanctions that currently attends the discovery of suppression by the 
government in criminal cases. 182 The law and literature of the exclu-
sionary rule analogously applied to violations of search and seizure 
restrictions indicate the difficulties of moving to monetary sanctions 
or incarceration as responses to governmental misconduct. 183 To be 
sure, there are certain differences that weaken the analogy. Most im-
portantly, the wrong of suppressing potentially exculpatory evidence 
is very different from the wrong of securing inculpatory evidence in an 
improper manner. Even a jury that wants to be tough on crime is 
more likely to acknowledge the former illegality in a verdict. 184 It is 
not so implausible, therefore, to consider modes of response, such as 
governmental liability, that can achieve compensatory goals without 
unnecessarily imposing or risking acquittal of the guilty. 185 Neverthe-
less, given the probable background of potential complainants, it is 
181 Whether this sort of reasoning should be extended to civil litigants is an interesting 
question that requires further thought. Cf. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New 
Constitutional Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 1990 UTAH 
L. REV. 1 (criticizing the prevailing dichotomy between criminal and civil cases, but without 
reference to the distinction drawn in the text). 
182 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
183 See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 90, at 44-67 (concluding that exclu-
sionary rule serves important functions not adequately served by available substitutes). The 
basic conclusion is mirrored in the following comment about government destruction of 
evidence: 
[T]ort actions may be unlikely ever to serve as a significant deterrent to 
prosecutorial abuse. Juries are not usually sympathetic to guilty criminal defend-
ants, even when evidence was destroyed by law enforcement officials. When the 
defendant has been found innocent, the proof of damage caused by the destruction 
of evidence may be difficult. 
J. GORELICK, S. MARZEN & L. SOLUM, supra note 119, at 247. 
184 One other difference may be noted, though it is more ambiguous. Wrongdoing in the 
search and seizure context is more likely to be police wrongdoing; suppression is more likely to 
be prosecutorial. Not only may this difference by expected to support the point made in the 
text, since a trier of fact may have less sympathy for prosecutors than for police, but it also 
points to the greater potential use of sanctions under the special law of professional responsibil-
ity. Cf supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the potential com-
plainants here--defense attorneys-are in a rather poor position to be aggressive in pursuing 
the matter. 
185 See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing 
common-law tort action against government for destruction of evidence following dismissal of 
earlier criminal charges against plaintiff). 
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unlikely that civil or criminal liabilities can wholly displace eviden-
tiary sanctions in the present context. 
In the end, the right mix of responses to achieve the proper mea-
sure of reversal, compensation, and deterrence is a delicate matter. 
Much depends upon context, including the ever significant distinction 
between civil and criminal cases. Conscious reflection on the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the various alternatives may be expected to 
improve the quality of juridical response. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the existence of substantial discovery mechanisms, espe-
cially in civil cases, and despite the prosecution's duties of disclosure 
in criminal cases, the problem of suppression of evidence seems more 
serious than either the problem of unfound evidence or that of re-
jected evidence. No doubt, this judgment is affected by the tinge of 
fraud that often attends suppression. Moreover, addressing problems 
of unfound evidence involves interference with the parties' allocation 
of resources, and the law is understandably reluctant to interfere with 
litigants' resource autonomy by getting into the business of potentially 
detailed supervision of such allocations. In contrast, addressing sup-
pression has relatively little economic impact: If the evidence in ques-
tion is already available to the litigant, requiring in some way its 
revelation to the opponent or its presentation to the tribunal, or im-
posing sanctions for refusal to do so, usually involves a comparatively 
minimal expenditure and potential oversight burden. Rejected evi-
dence presents similarly minor resource allocation issues, but since 
the evidence involved is, by hypothesis, available to both parties, there 
is ordinarily little reason to suspect that its nonpresentation reflects 
anything other than its weak probativity. It is not difficult, therefore, 
to see why the law has had more to say about suppression than about 
either unfound or rejected evidence. 
On the other hand, the categories of response to the three differ-
ent problems have much in common. Most important is their charac-
ter as reinforcing the duty of the parties, when not exempted by 
proprietary or adversarial privilege, to present the best available pack-
age of evidence on the disputed facts of the case. The traditional ex-
clusionary rules, which make up what most people think of as the law 
of evidence, are placed in a better interpretive framework when seen 
as constituent parts of a larger fabric of procedural law possessed of 
this dominant theme. The end in view is accuracy of judgment, in the 
service of just dispute resolution, even when the means chosen operate 
prophylactically, that is, even when the rules impair the accuracy of a 
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particular result in order to create and maintain incentives that im-
prove accuracy in the long run of cases. Serious questions may well 
be raised about such a trade-off, especially when there exist alternative 
means of achieving the needed deterrence. The same criticism can be 
made, even more strongly, with regard to the use of evidentiary sanc-
tions to provide what I have called ancillary compensation, where the 
trade-off is not between current accuracy and long-run accuracy, but 
rather between current accuracy and the avoidance of litigating sepa-
rate claims for compensation. Nevertheless, the. importance of getting 
at the truth, elusive as it may be, remains central to the procedures 
controlling the proof process. 
